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Arevalo and Central American Unification.

Jefferson Mack Bishop

Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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AREVALO AND CENTRAL AMERICAN UNIFICATION

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
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requirements for the degree of
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The Latin American Studies Institute

by

Jefferson Mack Bishop

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M.A., Louisiana State University, 1966

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During the course of researching and writing a thesis, a student becomes indebted to any number of people. While this student appreciates the assistance rendered by all, he feels that certain persons must be singled out for special mention.

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The student is especially indebted to Dr. Juan José Arévalo, the subject of the thesis. Dr. Arévalo was most cooperative during the student's visit to Caracas. He went out of his way to make the student as comfortable as possible and, in addition to the interview, provided copies of some of his works, including one which is almost impossible to locate today. He reiterated on a number of occasions, that should any question arise later, this student should write to him and he would be more than happy to respond.

Lastly, this student feels a deep sense of self-obligation to pay

tribute to a person who truly deserves the title of "the students' teacher," Dr. Jane De Grummond. In an era when the relationship between students and teachers has become a highly impersonal one, Dr. De Grummond stands out in maintaining the "old-fashion" personal touch. She has been a beacon of moral support during my graduate years at Louisiana State University. No matter how heavy her workload, she always had time to see me and talk with me whenever I had a problem. In fact, I felt at times that when I suffered, she suffered more and when I was exhilarated, she was more so. Dr. De Grummond is indeed the teacher par excellence. Words can never express the gratefulness and admiration which this student feels for her. He can only say, "Thank you from the bottom of my heart."

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the post-independence history of the Central American republics, numerous attempts have been made to unify the region and any number of works have been written on the subject. For an attempt at unification to stand a chance of success, it must have the support of the Central American presidents. One of the most recent Central American presidents who was concerned with the unification theme was Dr. Juan José Arévalo, president of Guatemala from 1945 to 1951. This thesis seeks to treat Arévalo's pre-presidential ideas on Central American unity, his attempt to achieve this seemingly unobtainable goal during his presidency, and his post-presidential thought on the subject.

Chapter I provides the background for the subject by presenting a brief chronology and analysis of the life and political career of Arévalo. Chapter II treats Arévalo's thought on Central American unity during the period preceding his election as president of Guatemala. The presidential years are covered in Chapter III with the primary emphasis being placed on the unsuccessful attempt to form a federation consisting of Guatemala and El Salvador as the first step toward the eventual federation of all of the Central American republics. Chapter IV presents a summary and analysis of Arévalo's thought since he left the Guatemalan presidency in 1951 and Chapter V constitutes the overall conclusions reached on the basis of the research conducted and presented.

Arévalo has been an ardent unionist since the days of his youth. His concept of "progressive federation" has never been tried in the

course of the numerous attempts to reunite the isthmus. Arévalo's "progressive federation" envisions the eventual federation of all five Central American republics based on a gradual and consistent expansionary basis. The first step would be a federation composed of Guatemala and El Salvador as its only members. After a period of consolidation and the elimination of major problems, an anticipated period of from five to ten years, a third member (Honduras) would be added. After another period of consolidation Nicaragua would be incorporated into the federation and, likewise, Costa Rica. After a period of from roughly fifteen to thirty years, all the republics of the isthmus would be a part of the Federal Republic of Central America. The attempt at unification made during Arévalo's presidential administration was short-circuited by the political turmoil and military opposition in El Salvador. In spite of the failure to implement his idea of "progressive federation" as president, Arévalo continues to feel that this is the only realistic and feasible means for accomplishing Central American unification. He feels that the reunion of the Central American nations is both necessary and possible. Arévalo remains true to the unionist movement and is as firmly committed to the movement today as in the years of his youth.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the post-independence history of the Central American republics, there have been numerous attempts made to unify the region and any number of works have been written on Central American unification. For an attempt at unification to stand a chance of succeeding, it must have the full support of the Central American presidents. One of the more recent Central American presidents who was concerned with the unification theme was Dr. Juan José Arévalo, president of Guatemala from 1945 to 1951. This thesis seeks to treat Arévalo's pre-presidential ideas on Central American unity, his attempt to achieve this seemingly unobtainable goal during his presidency, and his post-presidential thought on the subject.

The study of the specific topic has been hampered on a number of occasions. Most of Arévalo's works were written and published during the 1930's and 1940's and copies today are quite scarce. Most of those acquired by this student were obtained from a bookstore in Buenos Aires. In some cases, works were borrowed through inter-library loan services. While conducting research in Guatemala City, this student was unable to find any of Arévalo's political works in the National Library and also was unable to locate any such works in the countless bookstores in the city.

Another handicap involved in conducting research, especially in Guatemala itself, was the fact that Arévalo was a reform president; and, since the resignation of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954, Arévalo has not

been welcomed in Guatemala by the conservative governments, neither those composed of the military nor the civilian governments dominated by the military. This point is reflected in the fact that the National Library-Archives building, which was built by the Arévalo administration, does not display a plaque signifying who was president at the time the edifice was built nor when it was built. This is certainly not the case with the National Palace, which was built by Jorge Ubico. Likewise, this student found his efforts blocked to use the Foreign Ministry archives by an official who, upon learning that the research topic involved Arévalo, developed an acute case of "no comprendo," even when the student was able to acquire the interpretative services of a Guatemalan. This was the only occasion when this student was unable to communicate with Guatemalans. This uncooperative attitude was not the case with a Guatemalan official at the United Nations as Señor Roberto Lavalle was most cooperative and helpful. According to Arévalo, his presidential papers are not in Guatemala but are stored in Mexico.

Dr. Arévalo was also most cooperative and helpful. At his request, the private interview was conducted in the student's hotel room--La Floresta--in Caracas, Venezuela on June 11, 1971. In all, this student met with Dr. Arévalo on three separate occasions--the first at the Guatemalan Embassy and the other two at the hotel. In addition, the student agreed to write Dr. Arévalo in case any further questions arose. Dr. Arévalo provided copies of several of his works to the student for his personal library.

This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter provides the background for the rest of the thesis by presenting a chronology of the life and career of Arévalo. Chapter two treats the thought

of Arévalo on Central America during the period preceding his election to the presidency. In the third chapter the presidential years are covered, specifically the attempt to bring about the federation between Guatemala and El Salvador as evidenced through the conferences at San Cristóbal de la Frontera and Santa Ana. The fourth chapter seeks to treat Arévalo's thought on unification since the termination of his presidential term in 1951. The final chapter constitutes the overall conclusions reached on the basis of the research conducted and presented herein.

CHAPTER I

JUAN JOSÉ ARÉVALO: THE PERSONAL ASPECT

On September 10, 1904, Juan José Arévalo, the first of five sons, was born to Mariano Arévalo and Elena Bermejo de Arévalo.¹ Mariano Arévalo was a farmer and cattleman of modest circumstances, living in the small town of Taxisco, in the department of Santa Rosa on the Pacific coast of Guatemala. Señora Arévalo was a school teacher.

Arévalo's primary and secondary education was obtained in various schools in Guatemala. In 1910, at the age of six, he enrolled in the Escuela Normal Central para Varones in Guatemala City. In 1913 he transferred to a school in his native Taxisco in order to study under the famed Federico Rivera Salazar. In 1914 Arévalo returned to Guatemala City and matriculated in Colegio Domingo Sabio. Once again in 1915, Arévalo attended school in Taxisco where he studied under a native teacher, Chon Chamo. The following year Arévalo was back in Guatemala

¹ The main sources on Arévalo prior to his assuming the presidency in 1945 include: Pedro Álvarez Elizondo, El Presidente Arévalo y el Retorno a Bolívar, (México, D.F.: Ediciones Rex, 1947); Carleton Beals, "School-Teacher President," Asia, 46 (August, 1946), 363-367; Marie Berthe Dion, Las Ideas Sociales y Políticas de Arévalo, (México, D.F.: Editorial América Nueva, 1958); and "Guatemala's New President, Dr. Juan José Arévalo Bermejo," Bulletin of the Pan American Union, 79 (July, 1945), 377-378. For an insight into Arévalo's thought, one might consult particularly the following works authored by Arévalo: Viajar es Vivir, (Buenos Aires: Imprenta Mercatalí, 1933); La Pedagogía de la Personalidad, (Buenos Aires: Edición oficial de la Facultad de Humanidades de La Plata, 1937); La Filosofía de los Valores en la Pedagogía, (Buenos Aires: Edición oficial de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de Buenos Aires, 1939); La Adolescencia como Evasión y Retorno, (Buenos Aires: Edición oficial de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de Buenos Aires, 1941); and Escritos Políticos (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1945).

City attending the Instituto Nacional Central de Varones. After an earthquake on Christmas day, 1917 destroyed the capital city, Arévalo entered the Instituto Nacional de Varones de Oriente which was located in Chiquimula and which attracted young men from Honduras and El Salvador as well as Guatemala. In Chiquimula, Arévalo completed his primary education and the first year of his secondary program. During the following year (1920) the educational system of Guatemala was disrupted due to the downfall of the Cabrera regime. Once the disorders were calmed and the schools able to reopen, Arévalo re-entered the Escuela Normal Central para Varones from which he graduated in 1922 with the title Maestro Normalista.

The year following his graduation, Arévalo taught at the Escuela Normal Central para Varones. In 1924 he accepted an additional job by becoming the chief of the Technical Section in the Ministry of Public Education. At approximately the same time he was made inspector of schools in the departments of Escuintla and Jalapa. In 1925 he received the title of Bachiller from the Instituto Centroamerica de Varones in Jalapa.

In 1926 Arévalo enrolled in the law school in Guatemala City while continuing employment as a teacher and in the Ministry of Public Education. That same year President José María Orellana died and a struggle ensued over the choice of a successor. Arévalo joined with the sector of university students supporting General Jorge Ubico, who lost to General Lázaro Chacón.

Arévalo made his first trip to Europe in 1926. He departed from Puerto Barrios aboard the German steamer Galicía which stopped at the Caribbean ports of Limón, Cristóbal, Cartagena, Curacaco, La Guayra and

Trinidad. In Europe Arévalo visited Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Brussels, Paris and Barcelona. While in Paris he published his first pedagogical work, a teachers' handbook dedicated to the primary schools of Guatemala.² Arévalo sailed from Barcelona on the Dutch steamer Spaardam and visited Havana, Veracruz and Mexico City before returning to Guatemala by train in May, 1927.

For a few months in 1927, Arévalo was the director of Cervantes Institute which was headed by Tomás Cacello, one of his former teachers. In the meantime, the administration of President Chacón conducted a contest which provided winners with scholarships to study in a foreign country of their choice. Arévalo won first place and chose to study in Argentina. A close friend, Luis Martínez Mont, won second place and chose Switzerland. The two friends left Guatemala together, sailed to Santiago, Cuba, and then to New York and from there to Cherbourg and Paris. They parted company in Paris, Arévalo sailing from Marsella via the Canary Islands, Río de Janeiro, Santos and Montevideo to Buenos Aires.

During the remainder of 1927 and the early part of 1928 Arévalo studied independently the geography, history and literature of Argentina. Since he was in Argentina in January, 1928, Arévalo represented Guatemala at the International Congress of American Teachers held in Buenos Aires. During the proceedings he met Elisa Martínez, an Argentine teacher, and they were married in July, 1929.

In April, 1928, Arévalo formally enrolled as a graduate student at the National University of La Plata. During the first two years he pursued studies in the divisions of education, philosophy, history and

² "Guatemala's New President," p. 377.

geography. Thereafter, he concentrated exclusively on education and philosophy.

The Arévalos visited Guatemala in 1931, traveling by way of Chile and Panamá. Arévalo's arrival in Guatemala coincided with the coming to power of General Jorge Ubico. Ubico offered Arévalo a position in the new government, but Arévalo rejected the offer although he did submit a proposal to Ubico recommending the creation of a faculty of philosophy and letters at the National University. Soon after his return to Argentina, Arévalo successfully defended his thesis, La Pedagogía de la Personalidad, on May 5, 1934, and received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Educational Science on May 24. The thesis analyzed the school of personalistic teachers whose system was based on the spiritualistic philosophy of the German Rodolfo Eucken, and it was the first of a trilogy which focused on the problem of education from three different perspectives.³

Following the conferring of the doctorate, the Arévalos flew to Guatemala. Juan José was made Inspector General of Schools in Guatemala, but the Ubico government "le prohibió ponerse en contacto con los maestros y estudiantes, así como dedicarse a la más insignificante actividad cultural."⁴ He was then assigned to the Oficial Mayor del Ministerio. In his new position Arévalo was instructed on three different occasions to write an address which would be highly complimentary to Ubico. On all three occasions Arévalo refused. Also in 1934

³ In 1934 Arévalo also published an elementary geography of Guatemala.

⁴ Carlos Arturo Calleja, "Juan José Arévalo, Presidente de Guatemala," in Alberto Ordoñez Argüello, Arévalo Visto por América, (Guatemala: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1951), p. 18.

Arévalo witnessed the brutal suppression of an attempted plot against the Ubico regime. He saw a number of his friends killed, friends who like himself had supported Ubico in 1926.

Arévalo was fully cognizant of the horrible reality of Guatemala in 1936.⁵ He had become aware of Ubico's use of executions, prisons and torture. Arévalo chose to go into exile and, since his wife had already returned to her home, he set out for Argentina again traveling by way of Europe where he visited Berlin and disliked what he saw in Hitler's Germany. From Hamburg, Arévalo went by boat via Lisbon, Río de Janeiro, Santos and Montevideo, and to Buenos Aires where he arrived in December, 1936.

He became a member of the newly created Faculty of Philosophy and Letters at the University of Tucumán and taught a course on the "Introduction to Literature." At the same time he taught ethics and logic at the Normal School, but before long--in August, 1937--he left Tucumán for a position with the National University of La Plata and, soon thereafter, also with the University of Buenos Aires. It was while he was teaching simultaneously at both universities in 1939 that Arévalo acquired Argentine citizenship.⁶

Another important event in his career was the publication in 1939 of the second part of his trilogy, La Filosofía de los Valores en la Pedagogía. This work was a brief history of the philosophy of values and their projection in the theory of education.

In 1941 Arévalo became Technical Director of the Normal School

⁵ Guillermo Salazar, ed., Democracia en Guatemala, (Guatemala: Imprenta "Hispania," 1951), p. 21.

⁶ Álvarez Elizondo, El Presidente Arévalo, p. 44. This would later create a minor problem for Arévalo in the 1944 presidential campaign.

for Teachers of San Luís which was associated with the recently-founded National University of Cuyo.⁷ At the request of University authorities he prepared recommendations on the founding of an Instituto Superior de Pedagogía. The University authorities accepted his recommendations and the Institute was founded in May, 1942, with Arévalo as its Director. One year later he moved to Mendoza to teach education at the Mendoza campus of the National University of Cuyo, and here he was named Inspector General for the secondary teaching program of the University. Simultaneously, Arévalo was named Inspector General of Schools for the province of Mendoza, but his tenure was brief because he protested the military coup of General Pedro Ramírez and was forced to leave Mendoza. Guillermo Salazar claims that:

Es allí, entonces, cuando el Arévalo-Maestro toma el primer contacto directo con el Arévalo-político. Asume el liderato, en Mendoza, de la defensa de la dignidad universitaria y de las Instituciones democráticas.⁸

Arévalo, in April, 1944, returned to the University of Tucumán where he taught education and psychology, unaware that events in Guatemala would soon change his entire life.

On July 1, 1944, General Jorge Ubico resigned the presidency and handed over power to a three-man junta. On that same day a group of intellectuals and professionals organized the National Renovation Party. Three days later, July 4, General Federico Ponce Vaides was named provisional president of Guatemala and announced that elections would be held at an early date. That same day, Arévalo received a cablegram

⁷ Arévalo published the third work of his trilogy in 1941. The work was La Adolescencia como Evasión y Retorno and was a psychological study of adolescence.

⁸ Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, p. 22.

from the National Renovation Party offering him the party's presidential nomination. Arévalo accepted the nomination on July 5.

Arévalo left Argentina for Guatemala in late August. He stopped in Santiago, Lima, San José and received an overwhelming welcome at Aurora when he arrived on September 3. His campaign for the presidency had thus begun, and this airport ovation goaded Ponce "into stepping up his campaign of repression and many leaders of the Arévalo forces sought refuge in the Mexican Embassy while their less fortunate colleagues were apprehended by the police."⁹ Arévalo himself accepted the advice of his supporters and temporarily took refuge in the Mexican Embassy on October 17. During the evening of October 19, Ponce was overthrown and found refuge in the Mexican Embassy the next afternoon. A new junta, consisting of Major Francisco Javier Arana, Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and civilian Jorge Toriello Garrido, took control of the government and carried out the presidential election in December, which Arévalo won with little difficulty. Arévalo possessed a number of traits which helped to account for his overwhelming victory at the polls. He was a civilian, had no ties with the old aristocracy, was an educator, came from a middle-class family, was relatively young (40), had gone into voluntary exile in protest against the Ubico regime, and was unknown to most people, including many of his closest and strongest supporters.

As Arévalo began his presidential term there were already indications that his dream of Central American unification might stand a chance of becoming a reality. A federation between Guatemala and El Salvador had been recommended as a first step toward unification of the five

⁹ Ronald M. Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1958), p. 13.

Central American republics at the convention of the Unionist Party the previous September.¹⁰ Another resolution passed at that same convention called on the Caribbean, Mexico, South America and the United States to foster the idea of Central American federation.¹¹

The Presidency

Juan José Arévalo was inaugurated as President of Guatemala on March 15, 1945, the date on which the new constitution went into effect.¹² He faced numerous obstacles in attempting to carry out his "revolutionary" program,¹³ not the least of these being the fact that Guatemala was a nation predominantly Indian and illiterate, accustomed to dictators. Arévalo entered office without any strong backing from the army and with the opposition of the aristocracy to him and his program. In addition, there was no organized support available to him and he constantly had to be on the alert against attempts to overthrow his government. This took time and resources away from his reform program which never had sufficient money. This situation became worse as credit

¹⁰ New York Times, September 20, 1944, 8:2.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The better works dealing with the presidency of Arévalo, 1945-1951, include: Richard Newbold Adams, Crucifixion by Power, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 184-191; Manuel Galich, Por Qué Lucha Guatemala, (Buenos Aires: Elmer Editor, 1956), pp. 93-218; Medardo Mejía, Juan José Arévalo o el Humanismo en la Presidencia, (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1951); Franklin D. Parker, The Central American Republics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 98-103; Mario Rodríguez, Central America, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 138-145; and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala.

¹³ "By our standards, Arévalo's reform program was moderate and certainly would be welcomed under the present Alliance for Progress. But considering Guatemala's past, it constituted a real revolution. . . ." Rodríguez, Central America, p. 142.

became scarce on the international market. Perhaps his most important handicap was the lack of trained personnel with which to staff the government and the autonomous commissions created during his presidency to operate new governmental programs. The Arévalo administration also suffered from the lack of foreign support. In speaking of this era in Guatemala's history, Harry Kantor has written that:

The revolution was an expression of the articulate section of Guatemala's population seeking political liberty and the economic development of their country. It is possible that if these enthusiastic young people had received adequate support and encouragement from the other governments of Central America and from the United States, they might eventually have developed some kind of stable government that would have improved life for the average Guatemalan.¹⁴

An additional problem which confronted Arévalo was his own lack of political experience. Until the time of his inauguration as president of Guatemala, he had never held an elective political office; his training and experience had been that of a scholar. As noted by one article, "Arévalo was an untried theorist, feeling his way."¹⁵ The first year as president provided Arévalo with considerable political experience and by early 1946 he was able to more effectively manage political affairs.¹⁶

The administration of President Arévalo suffered a number of failures during its life. Arévalo failed to develop a strong revolutionary

¹⁴ Patterns of Politics and Political Systems in Latin America, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), p. 71. A similar conclusion as to the lack of United States support is to be found in Norman A. Bailey, Latin America in World Politics, (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), p. 93.

¹⁵ "Guatemala: The First 100 Years Are the Hardest," Inter-American, V (April, 1946), p. 11.

¹⁶ "Arévalo has learned a lot about practical politics." Ibid., p. 12.

political party which could have helped to ensure the success of his program, both during his presidential term and in the succeeding years.¹⁷ There was no tax reform and, most notably, there was no major agrarian reform program undertaken.¹⁸ The administration was also criticized because of its failure to take strong nationalistic measures against the foreign-owned monopolistic business enterprises.¹⁹ It was during Arevalo's presidency that the Communists began to infiltrate the country, particularly in organizing labor unions and providing needed administrative skills for governmental departments and agencies.²⁰ Professor Mario Rodríguez feels that the greatest single mistake on Arévalo's part was his failure to conduct a thorough investigation into the murder of Arana in 1949.²¹

Despite all obstacles, the Arévalo administration managed to build up a formidable list of accomplishments which included the building of the National Library and Archives;²² a greatly improved system of public

¹⁷ Kantor, Patterns of Politics, p. 72.

¹⁸ Rodríguez, Central America, p. 140.

¹⁹ Peter H. Weiner, "Guatemala: The Aborted Revolution," Harvard Review, IV (Summer, 1966), p. 41.

²⁰ H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963), p. 424. Another author has written: "The official position of Arévalo as president toward Communism was based upon toleration of Communists as individuals but opposition to the formation of an organized Communist party. In practice, his government followed a policy of expediency which, while not directly encouraging the spread of Communism, did not hinder it and indirectly facilitated the growth and influence of the Communist movement." Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, p. 22.

²¹ Central America, p. 145.

²² Samuel Guy Inman, A New Day in Guatemala, (Wilton, Connecticut: Worldover Press, 1951), p. 8.

education;²³ the opening of the Nutrition Institute of Central America and Panama;²⁴ the establishment of the National Indian Institute in 1945;²⁵ the Social Security Institute in 1946;²⁶ and the Institute for the Development of Production in 1948;²⁷ and a new electoral law.²⁸

The Arévalo administration also strengthened the system of local government,²⁹ constructed low-cost housing units³⁰ as well as sanitation systems,³¹ extended rights and privileges to labor and encouraged the unionization of labor,³² nationalized and reorganized the Bank of Guatemala,³³ and conducted the first scientific census in Guatemala's

²³ Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 27-36. One of the education innovations used by the Arévalo administration was the cultural mission "to help speed the spread of knowledge to the isolated backward parts of the country." Inman, A New Day in Guatemala, pp. 22-23.

²⁴ Inman, A New Day in Guatemala, p. 22.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 31.

²⁶ K. H. Silvert, A Study in Government: Guatemala, (Publication 21; New Orleans: Middle American Research Institute, Tulane University, 1954), p. 11 and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 61-64.

²⁷ Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America: The Governing of Restless Nations, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1967), p. 291; Rodríguez, Central America, p. 142; and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 54-60.

²⁸ Adams, Crucifixion by Power, p. 187 and Silvert, A Study in Government, p. 11.

²⁹ Kantor, Patterns of Politics, p. 72 and Silvert, A Study in Government, pp. 61-91.

³⁰ Kantor, Patterns of Politics, p. 72.

³¹ Ibid., and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 42-46.

³² Adams, Crucifixion by Power, pp. 188-189; Anderson, Politics and Economic Change, pp. 290-291; Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, p. 129; and Silvert, A Study in Government, p. 11.

³³ Anderson, Politics and Economic Change, p. 291; Rodríguez, Central America, p. 141; and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 52-53.

history.³⁴ In the international field, Arévalo's government condemned the Communist aggression against South Korea and ratified the Río Treaty.³⁵ In reviewing the presidential term of Arévalo, journalist Carleton Beals feels that Arévalo is "comparable only to Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico."³⁶

Post-Presidency³⁷

On March 15, 1951, Arévalo surrendered the presidency to Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. During the Arbenz presidency, Arévalo was accorded credentials as an Ambassador-at-Large for Guatemala. On July 7, 1951, he left Guatemala for Argentina where he joined his wife and took a vacation.³⁸ It was felt that Arévalo's absence from Guatemala would clear the way for Arbenz to become president in fact as well as in name.³⁹

Arévalo returned to Guatemala in October, 1951, "on receipt of the news that his mother was very ill."⁴⁰ Evidently his wife returned with him as in November they left for Havana where they were to reside for several months.⁴¹ Arévalo returned to Guatemala in June, 1953, after

³⁴ Samuel Shapiro, Invisible Latin America, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 30 and Salazar, Democracia en Guatemala, pp. 72-73.

³⁵ Theodore Draper, "How Red Is Guatemala?" Reporter, (November 7, 1950), p. 26.

³⁶ Personal communication to this student, dated January 12, 1970.

³⁷ Little, if anything, has been written on Arévalo since he left the presidency in 1951.

³⁸ New York Times, July 8, 1951, 16:8.

³⁹ Ibid., July 13, 1951, 1:6.

⁴⁰ Ibid., October 9, 1951, 14:8.

⁴¹ Ibid., November 15, 1951, 11:4.

spending a year traveling as Ambassador-at-Large to countries in Europe and South America.⁴² Also in 1953, Arévalo published another work entitled Escritos Políticos y Discursos. This was an updated collection of the essays which he had written between 1935 and 1945 that had originally been published as Escritos Políticos in 1945.

On June 27, 1954, Arbenz resigned the presidency of Guatemala and was granted asylum in the Mexican Embassy. The junta which assumed control of the government canceled the diplomatic credentials of Arévalo.⁴³ After the fall of Arbenz, Arévalo wrote Guatemala, la Democracia y el Imperio in which he bitterly attacked the role of the United Fruit Company and the United States Department of State in Arbenz's downfall.⁴⁴ Two years later Arévalo published Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas, another book in which he attacked the foreign policy of the United States Government.⁴⁵ The last major work to date appeared in 1959 under the title AntiKommunism en América Latina.⁴⁶

From 1959 through 1962, Arévalo was employed as a professor by the Central University of Venezuela in Caracas.⁴⁷ It was here that he

⁴² Ibid., June 15, 1953, 5:2.

⁴³ Ibid., June 30, 1954, 2:5.

⁴⁴ The book was published in several editions in 1954 in Santiago, Montevideo and Mexico City. In 1955 editions were printed in Buenos Aires and Tel Aviv containing an added epilogue.

⁴⁵ (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Meridión, 1956). It was also published in Santiago in 1956. An English translation was published by Lyle Stuart (New York) in 1961 under the title of The Shark and the Sardines.

⁴⁶ (Buenos Aires: Editorial Palestra, 1959). An English translation was published in 1963 by Lyle Stuart (New York) under the title of Anti-Kommunism in Latin America, with an introduction by Carleton Beals.

⁴⁷ Juan José Arévalo, private interview held at La Floresta Hotel, Caracas, Venezuela, June 11, 1971.

next surfaced politically.⁴⁸ In a letter to his supporters in Guatemala City, he agreed to a proposal that the left-wing elements which had backed him during his presidency should support his candidacy for the presidency in the 1963 election.⁴⁹ His supporters claimed that Arévalo would soon thereafter move to Mexico and would conduct the early stages of his presidential campaign from that country. President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes let it be known that he would not hinder the return of Arévalo, a switch from his 1959 position when he said that Arévalo would not be permitted to return to Guatemala under any circumstances.

In 1962, probably in October, Arévalo left Venezuela and went to Mexico City where, on November 26, he announced his candidacy for president in the December, 1963, election; he once again declared his antipathy for Castroism and Communism.⁵⁰ Opposition from the right in Guatemala began mobilizing against Arévalo, stimulated by the remarks of United States Ambassador John O. Bell.⁵¹ In late March, 1963, Arévalo flew by private plane from Mexico to a small town near the Guatemalan Pacific coast.⁵² From there he went by car to Guatemala City while a

⁴⁸

New York Times, December 26, 1961, 6:3.

⁴⁹

Ibid.

⁵⁰

Ibid., October 21, 1962, 32:1.

⁵¹

"Ambassador John O. Bell told an American newspaperman that Arévalo was a communist and thus unworthy of the presidency." Mario Rodríguez, "Guatemala in Perspective," Current History, 51 (December, 1966), p. 339.

⁵²

Arévalo, private interview. The reports concerning this trip are highly conflicting, but this student has accepted Arévalo's version. For example, one writer claimed that Arévalo crossed into Guatemala by car. Peter Nehemkis, Latin America: Myth and Reality (rev.ed.; New York: New American Library, 1966), p. 109. Another claimed that he left Guatemala in disguise and crossed the border by car through Chiapas. New York Times, April 21, 1963, 28:1.

curfew was in effect. "His sudden appearance in the capital Friday night electrified the country and was considered one of the most important events leading to the coup" of March 31.⁵³ With the overthrow of Ydígoras Fuentes, Arévalo's hope of regaining the presidency received a fatal blow. The coup of March 31 was seen by most observers as the only way to prevent Arévalo from winning the presidential election and resuming power.⁵⁴

Arévalo left Guatemala City by car and went to another small town in Guatemala where the same plane which had flown him to Guatemala carried him back across the border and into Mexico.⁵⁵ Upon reaching Mexican soil, Arévalo was seized by Mexican officials and treated as an illegal immigrant. This treatment resulted in economic deprivation for him. He, therefore, sought and received employment with the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization and worked for UNESCO in Chile and Mexico for the next four years.⁵⁶ In 1968 the Guatemalan Government named Arévalo as Ambassador to Chile. He served in that position until after the 1970 presidential election, from which he had been barred by a constitutional provision which prohibited a person from holding the presidency for more than one term. The Guatemalan Government, early in 1971, offered Arévalo his choice of two diplomatic posts.⁵⁷ He was permitted to choose between the positions of Ambassador

⁵³ New York Times, April 1, 1963, 1:1.

⁵⁴ Edwin Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 42.

⁵⁵ Arévalo, private interview.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

to Israel or Ambassador to Venezuela. He selected the Caracas assignment and assumed his duties on March 1, 1971, a position which he currently holds (June, 1971).

CHAPTER II

THE PRE-PRESIDENTIAL YEARS

Prior to his term as president of Guatemala, Arévalo had written two essays which focused on Central America.¹ The first essay, "Istmania (Tierras del Istmo)," was written in 1935 while Arévalo was employed by the Ubico regime.² The second essay, "Cultura y posibilidades de cultura en la América Central," was written in 1939 while Arévalo was teaching at the National University of La Plata.³ Each essay will be summarized separately and the chapter concluded with an analysis of these early writings by Arévalo.

"Istmania (Tierras del Istmo)"

This essay is directed to the youth by "un fervoroso maestro de escuela [que] os pide atención."⁴ Arévalo defines "nuestra patria" as comprising the small nations which extend from the isthmus of Tehuantepec to the isthmus of Panama. To these small nations Arévalo applies

¹ He still feels that these two essays are his most important writings on the subject. Arévalo, private interview.

² Juan José Arévalo, "Istmania (Tierras del Istmo)," in the author's Escritos Políticos, pp. 12-28; and Istmania o la Unidad Revolucionaria de Centroamérica, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Indoamérica, 1954), pp. 15-32.

³ Arévalo, Escritos Políticos, pp. 57-69; and Istmania, pp. 33-43.

⁴ Arévalo, Istmania, p. 18. From this point onward, all references will cite Arévalo's Istmania only.

the name of Istmania.⁵ And, according to Arévalo, "Istmania es uno de los lugares más atrasados del planeta."⁶ He observes that the region has changed little in the four hundred years since the coming of the Spanish and that the journey of Cortés would encounter most of the same obstacles today that it did then.

With the arrival of the Spanish and the sacrifice by the Indians of their chiefs and idols, the Indian forever gave up all choice of independence insofar as the future of the isthmus was concerned:

De manos de España a manos de Inglaterra, de manos de Inglaterra a manos de los yanquis: he ahí la historia de cuatro siglos de vida postindiana. En las tierras del istmo, los blancos no hemos sabido nunca lo que es independencia.⁷

Less than three centuries ago, the Captaincy-General of Guatemala possessed both a University and an official culture. Guatemala City was an intellectual center where both natives and foreigners could go to express themselves, although limited primarily at that time to expression within religious confines. However, Arévalo maintains that not one of the small republics of Istmania currently possesses what could deserve to be called a university and all lack an official culture.

Arévalo observes that approximately one hundred years ago, the five small republics of the isthmus were all united as one nation. The nation had been organized under the direction of learned and wise men and enjoyed economic solidarity and cultural unity. Yet today Istmania

⁵ "La palabra Istmania fue inventada por Arévalo como posible nombre de la futura República Federal Centroamericana." Arévalo, unpublished typed statement on Central American unity presented to this student at La Floresta Hotel, Caracas, Venezuela, June 11, 1971, p. 1.

⁶ Arévalo, Istmania, p. 18.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

is divided into small republics, economically disabled and blinded by a narrow vision of nationality:

Quiere decir que el gran valor biológico (el ambiente) todavía conserva entre nosotros sus caracteres primitivos; el gran valor espiritual (la independencia) no lo conocemos; el gran valor social (la cultura) no nos ha llegado, y el gran valor histórico (la nacionalidad) lo hemos perdido. Esto es Istmania.⁸

He admits that he has painted a crude picture of the region, but claims that it is an accurate one. If the numerous illustrious lives which have been consumed over the past four hundred years are taken into account, and if the fabulous wealth which has been expropriated from Central America by foreigners while "los criollos se divertían matándose"⁹ is considered, then the picture changes from crude to gloomy and to tragedy. Arévalo places the blame for this situation on past generations. The future of Istmania depends on the youth and the generations to come.

Arévalo maintains that those persons who speak of the favorableness of the region's geographical position and of the incalculableness of its wealth are perpetrators of fiction. Such arguments are advanced merely to conceal the real problem. A country does not impose itself on others through its geographical position nor through the density of its forests. The bays, malaria and bananas are incapable of forging one piece of history. History is made by men. The past four centuries of Central American history were the product of many condemnable generations. If one clings to geography as the main element in history, then one declares himself as believing in lies.

The more accurate approach is that of believing that Central

⁸
Ibid., p. 19

⁹
Ibid.

America is forging its future despite geography, despite the tropics. Perhaps the geographical position is unique and perhaps there is wealth in the region which can be harnessed for the destiny of a people; nevertheless, it is the younger generation which is solely capable of organizing the future destiny of the region.

According to Arévalo, there are two great factors which influence the development of any society--economic and spiritual. The problem of values is more complex than (the then-) current political orators and sociological writers recognized. Social life is not determined by any one law or any one factor, but rather is more complex. Social life cannot be reduced to lines or numbers.

In social life, as in individual life, the economic factor is never sufficient to guarantee a happy and beautiful life. Money per se for an individual is incapable of possessing more than a quantitative importance. In order to make a qualitative appraisal, the notion of the "use" to which the money is put must be taken into consideration. The economist maintains that the "use" is also the economic value; but it is here, Arévalo contends, that we are led astray.

For "use" to have any value, it must first be judged in terms of whether the use is good or bad. To make either "good use" or "bad use" of a thing is something that cannot occur unless a person has a notion of finalidad firmly conceived in his conscience. It is this finalidad which orients one in individual or social life.

The notion of finalidad is never one of economics; rather, it is a spiritual value which a person develops "después de madurada la experiencia y cuando ya tiene consciencia de su personalidad (en lo

individual) y de su misión (en lo social)."¹⁰

From the crude wealth and unfavorable geographical position of Istmania nothing can be hoped for unless there can be imprinted on the mind the necessity for this crude wealth to be converted into preferred uses. Likewise, a historical mission must be implanted in the aspirations of the masses and in a collective ideology.

Arévalo then asks to what use has Istmania's wealth been put over the past four centuries. Or, more to the point, what has been the individual finalidad preferred by Central Americans and what has been the historical orientation demonstrated by the governments of Istmania?

A frank response to the question would, according to Arévalo, explain the essence of the region's failure as a historical entity. Unless an individual is conscious of the value of his personalidad, he is not able to make a nation conscious of its historical mission. It is precisely because the governors have always been men of obscure consciousness of their own personal mission and because the masses have always entertained a mistaken opinion as to the role of the governors that the region has remained so backward throughout its history.

The social structure found in all the countries of Central America reveals unmistakable primitive characteristics. The more astute observer would not be able to discover in any one of the republics more than a gigantic skeleton--the public administration.

Arévalo concedes that it is not an easy task to define with exactness the appropriate characteristics of a civilized country and those of a backward society. Lacking any precision in definition,

¹⁰
Ibid., p. 21.

Arévalo erects certain orientations which can be used to distinguish one stage of development from the other.

One of the unmistakable differences is to be found in the social composition. Arévalo adopts the term "structure" and defines it as a center around which various elements of the social life are organized. The social composition in a civilized country is polystructural, that is, "los distintos elementos sociales están armados alrededor de varias estructuras, alrededor de varios ejes, que podemos suponer ordenados como los dedos de una mano."¹¹ The fundamental structures found in contemporary states number five: economic life, social life, culture, government and the army.

In a well-organized modern state, each one of these fundamental structures enjoys an independent existence with purposes and mediums that are its own, and without endangering the general unity of the nation. In other words, the five fundamental structures exist in a mutual harmonious interrelationship with each other. Consequently, a country which has achieved a position of prominence in the contemporary social order will have succeeded in its five primordial centers:

demostrando la capacidad de su economía general, la excelencia de sus costumbres sociales, la labor doctrinaria y de investigación de sus hombres de pensamiento, la acertada administración pública de sus estadistas cuando llegan al poder, y la firmeza de las fuerzas armadas, consideradas como un sostén de la integridad de territorio nacional.¹²

While there is no confusion of values to be found between the fundamental structures, there does exist an echelon of values within each of the structures. Each structure has its own established values

¹¹ Ibid., p. 23.

¹² Ibid., p. 24.

and merits, which are not so regarded within each of the other structures. Arévalo almost seems to regard each structure as a world unto itself since each has its own rewards and need not fear or envy any of the other structures.

The situation is very different in countries possessing a backward social organization. In these countries the polystructure of the civilized nations does not exist. There exists no more than a monostructure--one of the five previously-mentioned structures, which most closely resembles the political order.¹³ The monostructure in such a country is the general administration of the country which is usually in the hands of the strongest, economically speaking. According to Arévalo, the common characteristic in this case is the unlawful matrimony between the government and the army--a concubinage so common that in such nations the army comes to be considered the highest authority of the state. The other structures--economic, social and culture--may exist, but they are completely dependent on the government.

A person living in a monostructural country has no alternative except to incorporate himself into the single structure--the public administration. The citizen may desire to maintain his independence but he is forced or pressured into being dependent on the government. In such a country, the influence of the government is extended considerably and the success or failure of a person is judged solely on his performance in the single structure. Value is determined not on the basis of the individual person but by the office he occupies. Only one set of

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Throughout the essay, Arévalo uses the terms "political order," "government," "public administration" and "general administration" interchangeably.

values applies--that of the single structure.

In monostructural nations, the culture, economic life and social life as structures are confused lamentably. The promotion of an official within the public administration guarantees the person an entrance into the social hierarchy of the country. Such an achieved admission is usually regarded by most people as a demonstration of the person's general value or worth. Likewise, such a promotion demonstrates that the person has "talent" and "culture" although he may in reality never have demonstrated such and, unfortunately, "es que no se concibe entre las gentes de la calle que pueda llegar a un alto puesto una persona que no sea de talento."¹⁴

In addition, all persons engaged in commerce, industry, agriculture, production, transport, sales, and the like are forced to base their existence on the current political order. For these people, the government and its policies mean life or death, survival or extinction. These people have no choice but to depend on the government.

The intellectuals in a monostructural country are esteemed according to the significance of the office which is bestowed upon them and at times according to their friendship with high public officials. The position of women in such a society is based on their marital and/or social connections with public officials. The members of the military enjoy a guaranteed position as "loyal" servants of the state depending on the pleasure of the governing political party. However, in reality the party is dependent upon the military as its basic source of support.

Social monostructure is the primitive structure in all societies;

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Arévalo, Istmania, p. 26.

it is the form which every society manifests in the beginning. However, not only primitive societies possess such a characteristic but also there are some countries which have preserved the trait by virtue of numerous circumstances. The persistence of the monostructure is the work of both the governed and the governors. The governed contribute to the continuing existence of such a system as a sort of mental rearguard action through which it is believed that they are preserving personal and social values. The governors preserve such a system in order to maintain their illegitimate interests, to demonstrate their power, or to extend the control of the government. In the monostructural system, the educational process clearly lacks any social orientation which would normally (in a polystructural system) remedy such defects. However, Arévalo does not place any blame on the teachers as it is the government, once again, which controls the educational system and, therefore, controls what is taught. The teachers do not enjoy sufficient liberty to criticize but are dependent upon the government.

There are two things which are essential if the monostructural form of society is to be changed. First, there has to be an efficient education of individuals with due regard to the problem of values. Second, there has to exist, or be brought into existence, a knowledge--however superficial--of life in a civilized country. Arévalo realizes that the people of Central America cannot observe or experience first-hand life in a civilized society. The answer, therefore, is that it is the responsibility of the intellectuals to act as bearers of the civilizing word.

Arévalo poses the question, how does one proceed from this China wall which curtails all possibility of progress? The most valuable

instrument available to break down the wall is the illumination of young spirits, the only ones who are capable of forging a new structure in the countries of Istmania. However, the fact that a person is young does not automatically qualify him for such a role. The role demands a particular type of young person.

Arévalo then distinguishes between three concepts which he says are customarily used as synonyms: individual, person and personalidad. An individual is one who biologically possesses human characteristics, or is an individual by virtue of being born and enjoying the capacity to procure for himself the means of subsistence. A person is seen as enjoying a higher status in the life of a specie. This term applies solely to those individuals who are incorporated into a system of law--entering into juridical relations with one's fellow citizens. The very act of being a bearer of obligations and laws, which are effectively guaranteed by the state, elevates the individual to the status of a person. To obtain the superior stage of personality, a person has to succeed in defining and imposing on his life a consciously-chosen finalidad.

There is no incompatibility between these three situations of man. As a man advances from one stage to another, he retains the conditions of the previous state while acquiring the additional traits of his new state. Thus, a man who achieves the status of personalidad remains an individual and a person. However, taking into account all of the population, there are relatively few who succeed in achieving the plane of personality. This plane is of an ethical character. The vast majority of people do reach the stage of persons. Finally, there are a relatively small number of people--inhabitants of savage regions,

for example--who never progress past the stage of an individual. As it is in the world, so it is in Central America. As Arévalo notes: "tenemos que habérnosla con no pocos individuos, generalmente con personas y en casos muy excepcionales con personalidades."¹⁵

"Nuestro problema es solamente el problema de la personalidad."¹⁶ It is the young who achieve the advanced stage of personalidad in whose hands Arévalo places the future of Istmania.

"Cultura y posibilidades de cultura en la América Central"¹⁷

Occupying the prolonged isthmus which unites the two large Americas, the United Provinces of Central America came into being following the independence of the Captaincy-General of Guatemala in 1821. Guatemala City continued to serve as the capital city for the new federal system as it had for the Captaincy-General. Guatemala City had monopolized for its own exclusive benefit the material and spiritual riches of the isthmus. Guatemala, therefore, found it easy to continue its political, military and cultural hegemony over the other member-states in the federation.

The men who became the governors of the federation were faced with the task of maintaining the unity and uniformity of life in a territory of a half million square kilometers, all governed from the extreme northeast. The first quarter of the nineteenth century in Central

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ References to citations in the original work continue to be taken solely from Arévalo's Istmania.

America gave rise to convulsions of ideologies in conflict, a distant echo of the French Revolution, and the collapse of colonial government. Spiritually the population divided into two groups--conservatives and liberals--which began to vie for control of the government of the new republic. The conservatives were men skilled in the arts of government and aspired to prolong the existence of the colonial social structure. The liberals, on the other hand, were disenchanted with the system of colonial government and represented the genuine revolutionary spirit with its axioms of the transformation of the juridical system and of popular education. Within each group were to be found eminent men who had the opportunity to imprint their contributions on the development of each of the states in the federation.

However, the states and even areas within the states were plagued by regional jealousies and the idea of separatism spread. These states and their internal subdivisions disliked the predominance of Guatemala within the federal system and this discontent was successfully exploited by inferior caudillos. The internal wars undermined the national harmony and unity and the federation began to splinter. The once-united isthmus disintegrated into the present five small republics: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In a footnote, Arévalo notes that the present republic of Panama possesses the same characteristics as the Central American republics, although he does not include Panama within the label "Central America."¹⁸

From the moment of disintegration, the social panorama of the

¹⁸ Even today Arévalo would not include Panama as part of Central America. "Es una parte de Colombia, una parte de Sur América." Arévalo, private interview.

republics changed fundamentally. Each country was reduced to a small territory, found its economic possibilities limited to the minimum, fortified the position of the powerful executive to the detriment of other public forces, and lamentably confused the political function with the military profession. Each country began to quench the independence of the civil, cultural and economic life.

The Central American nation, devoured by frequent and horrible civil wars, had little time to organize its juridical and economic life. The life of the federation was too short to enable it to overcome the deplorable cultural inheritance from the colonial period. After dividing into five republics, the wars continued between the states and revolution was converted into the preferred occupation of the inhabitants of the isthmus. Needless to say, under such conditions the public wealth as well as official and popular attention were not placed at the service of popular education nor the development of commerce, industry and the arts. The single notable benefit derived from the rupture of the federation was the disappearance of the great inequality which previously existed in all orders of life between Guatemala and the other states.

It is the culture, that which is tacitly and universally understood as culture, that has been displaced by the agitated political and military life of the isthmus and by the rupture of the federation. Culture is understood as the spontaneous and accompanying flowering of popular feeling which continues in its free genesiactal power until it emerges in artistic forms of clear collective effect and of evident national filiation. Culture is the spontaneous and accompanying intellectual achievement of the masses which, in slow ascent, continues to surpass its individual and collective predecessors. Culture is the

spontaneous and accompanying activity of families, of groups, of centers of popular education, of educators of all the specie, which in a fervent crowd turns its eyes to the young generations in order to make them participants in the spiritual riches. Culture is the spontaneous and accompanying activity of the centers of superior culture, including the universities, which are called upon to reform, conserve, revise, renovate, create and extend the pure richness of nationality. Culture is, then, a certain atmosphere of collective, material and spiritual dignity, which appears not as the work of an individual laborer, is not at the service of any government, is not the property of any social class, nor is it suppressed as a political or economic casualty. Culture, therefore, is a social force on the march--anterior, superior and posterior to the individual. Culture is a social force which serves as the base or foundation for all individual contributions.

After making such observations on culture, Arévalo notes that culture in Central America has not obtained the height of success which is found in the other regions of America. The life of the multitudes in Central America has not benefited from the abundant means nor the circumstances which are enjoyed by the masses in the majority of the republics of the continent. The Central American isthmus has contributed outstanding individuals to the world in all areas of endeavor, such as Rubén Darío, Francisco Morazán, and Alberto Masferrer.¹⁹ However, culture is

¹⁹"Medicos sabios como el contemporáneo Rodolfo Robles; creadores espirituales, verdaderos genios, como Rubén Darío; pensadores de profundas proyecciones sociales y de aliento revolucionarios como Lorenzo Montúfar; militares insignes, de suprema nobleza moral, como Francisco Morazán; sabios humanistas al mismo tiempo que poetas excelsos, como Francisco Gavidia; diplomáticos de altiva dignidad como Gustavo Guerrero; prosistas de fama universal como Enrique Gómez Carrillo; filósofos de aliento especulativo y de unción mística, como Alberto Masferrer; héroes simbólicos, en fin, como el épico Juan Santamaría." Arévalo, Istmania, p. 39.

not measured by the number of exceptional individuals, but rather in the course of all joining together in undertaking service to all.

In Central America this working together has not been achieved. There is in the five republics an evident thirst for culture. "Pero la estrechez de las fronteras políticas y el simplismo de la vida pública vincula demasiado la cultura con factores culturalmente negativos."²⁰ The primary factor involved in the persistence of such a "cultural thirst" is that the republics are monostructural in form. Culturally the republics exist much as they did during the colonial period. Even the brief period of federation following independence made little difference due to the turbulent political life of the period.

Arévalo maintains that if they are to escape from this monostructural state, the Central American countries will have to be reunited geographically. The reunion of the five small republics into one great republic would automatically cancel out the powerful executive. The cultural heritage would be born anew. Arévalo feels that in the isthmus the indispensable spiritual qualities requisite for a collective revival are not lacking. In the popular masses there are veins of moral nobleness which can be intelligently cultivated through the tutelage of free generations. There still endures the better chivalrous virtues inherited from the Spanish nobility. There vibrates in the spirit of the masses a certain sensibility which has not yet succeeded in completely expressing itself artistically. There is a profound attachment to the land and a disposition to work. The aboriginal races, which exhibit an infinite patience and an ingenuous goodness, can be converted into fertile

²⁰ Ibid., p. 40.

collaborators for a program of renewal or revival. All of these elements, which tend toward an overall design, are found disseminated in the societies of the isthmus. However, neither a superior culture nor a spiritual revival is possible without reconstructing the political federation.

Political federation is imperatively necessary for the Central American people. Such a federation would consume the all powerful caudillos--those egotistical and voracious individualities who use the public wealth for their own benefit--and the coarse governors who lack the proper spiritual qualities, especially in their private lives. A superior culture is not possible as long as the organs of spiritual elevation--the school, teacher, press, university, etc.--do not enjoy effective autonomy, such as found in a civilized or polystructural society. Such a condition exists in some American nations. Central America also needs to achieve the same.

Conclusion

In the two essays, written more than three decades ago, Arévalo seems to be indulging more in an exercise of the mind than in an earnest attempt to treat the problem of Central American unification. In discussing the disintegration of the United Provinces of Central America, Arévalo contended that there were eminent men to be found among both the conservative group and the liberal group. While not defining the term "eminent," there seems to be implied that these men possessed the highest virtue of personalidad. If this was the case, the question arises as to why were they unable to prevent the rupture of the federation. After all, Arévalo later claims, one of the factors which has prevented

reunification of the isthmus is that the nations have been governed by men of obscure consciousness as to their own personal mission, or, in other words, non-possessors of personalidad.²¹

Another contention made by Arévalo was that the rupture of the federation served to fortify the position of a powerful executive in each of the republics. He does not reveal how or why this occurred. The contention also implies that the powerful executive was something new and to which Central America was not accustomed. However, it might be argued that the powerful executive existed during the colonial period as well as during the two decades of the United Provinces. In fact, it was the hegemonial position of Guatemala and the chief executive of the federation which served as one stimulant for the rupture. Arévalo himself admits that an advantage of the disintegration was that it created a greater equality for the other four states in relation to Guatemala.

A third contention concerning the rupture of the federation was that it led to the matrimony of government and army. This contention is also questionable. The mere disintegration of the United Provinces cannot be blamed for the confusion of the governmental and military functions. The merging or confusion had come into existence prior to the rupture. In the essay on culture, Arévalo cited Francisco Morazán

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This contention itself is highly argumentative. It seems unjust to condemn every political official in each of the five republics over the past century. It is hard to imagine that the Central American nations would have failed to produce any leader(s) who justly could be said to have possessed personalidad. Arévalo would seem to be overstating his case on this particular point. Arévalo stated--on June 11--that one of these leaders (Justo Rufino Barrios) had influenced his own thinking. Arévalo, private interview.

as an outstanding military figure of supreme moral nobleness.²² It would seem that Arévalo has at least implied that a combining of the two roles or structures either was already occurring or had occurred. It appears highly unlikely that the combination was a direct result of the failure of the federation. This is not to say that the failure might not have speeded up the process or aided it, but only that the process had already commenced.

Jumping from the rupture of the federation to the modern era, certain questions arise in relation to the monostructural-polystructural forms of societies. Accepting the two stages as outlined by Arévalo, it has to be conceded that the Central American countries--at least at the time that he was ~~writing~~--were monostructural societies. The goal set forth by Arévalo which each monostructural country should strive to obtain was that of the polystructural stage. It is particularly at this point that problems begin to arise for which there seem to be no concrete answers. The major problem is how does a country go about changing from a primitive to a civilized society. Arévalo's primary emphasis is placed on education which, of course, reflects his chosen profession. Arévalo maintains that if a country is to break out of its monostructural rut, it is necessary that there be provided an efficient education of individuals with due regard to the problem of values. Therefore, all that has to be done is to programme the educational system with the preferred social orientations and the desired change will result. However, there is a slight problem involved. Arévalo has already admitted that the educational system cannot perform its true role

²² Arévalo, Istmania, p. 39.

in a monostructural society. After all, in such a society, the educational system is dominated by the government, which is part of the problem at hand. Certainly the government cannot be expected to set up an educational program aimed at severely restricting its power. Thus, the problem exists as to how does one go about illuminating the young spirits in a monostructural society in order to set in motion forces which will lead to the creation of a polystructural society. Arévalo gives no answer for this problem.

A second element for changing a monostructural society, according to Arévalo, involves providing the citizens with a knowledge of life in a civilized society. Since the people of Central America cannot be expected to travel to a civilized country to make the necessary observation, Arévalo contends that it is the responsibility of the intellectuals to act as transmitters of the civilizing word. The question immediately arises as to whether or not these intellectuals actually exist. If we accept the definition and existence of the monostructural society, is it possible for intellectuals--in the truest sense of the word--to develop and exist? Where do these intellectuals come from? How do they pass "the civilizing word" on to the masses? Again, Arévalo fails to provide the answers for such questions.

Closely related to the change by educational means is Arévalo's concern with the small percentage of a society which can be said to have achieved the status of *personalidad*. He contends that the problem is solely that of the personalidad. It is this group upon whom depends the destiny of a society. However, while emphasizing the uniqueness and importance of this group, Arévalo provides no insight as to how personalidades can be created. How does one go about developing personalidad

in himself? How does one go about fostering the obtainment of personalidad in others? It would seem that the fostering of this group would receive more attention from Arévalo since he attaches such importance to it. But once again, the intellectual stops short of providing the necessary answers.

Arévalo also contends that the reconstruction of the political federation would create a superior culture and a spiritual revival. The question is how? Arévalo claims that the indispensable spiritual qualities which are necessary for a collective revival are not lacking in Central America. All that is needed is the reestablishment of the federation and these forces will surface and the cultural heritage of the region will be born anew. The question still remains as to how the mere reconstitution of the federation can bring about such an event.

In discussing the rupture of the United Provinces, Arévalo touched on several causes which he felt were responsible for the federation's demise. He pointed out that the society became divided into conservatives and liberals, with the conservatives eventually gaining the upperhand. The question arises as to whether or not the population is still divided today as then. Arévalo seems to imply that this condition no longer exists, an implication which certainly is not accurate. A second factor in the rupture was the existence of regional jealousies. Is not this still the case in the Central America of today? Arévalo also contended that discontent was successfully exploited by inferior caudillos. Has this condition disappeared from the political scene? Perhaps all these questions can be combined into one: are not the same divisive forces present today which contributed to the breakup of the United Provinces of Central America?

Arévalo places great faith in the potential accomplishments which would result from the political reunification of the isthmus. He is sincere in his great expectations, but it would also seem that he is highly unrealistic at the same time. As already noted, he believes that it would bring about a superior culture and a spiritual revival. How this result would be effected by mere federation he does not explain. He maintains that federation would ensure the development of a polystructural society. He does not say why this would occur nor how it would be brought about. And, finally, he ~~claims~~ that reunion would automatically cancel out the powerful executive. Once again, he does not say why or how. It has to be conceded, of course, that if the federation brought about a polystructural society then the powerful executive would disappear by definition. Of course, one is left wondering why all of this cannot occur within each republic without the necessity of reunification and, indeed, it could be argued that this has occurred at least in the case of Costa Rica.

In the two essays reviewed, Arévalo did not discuss the numerous attempts that have been made to reunite the Central American republics since the disintegration of the United Provinces. He particularly avoided treating both the negative and positive factors involved in the modern attempts at reunification, such as the attempt in 1921. In effect, both essays were intellectual exercises of the mind with little or no concrete concern as to how to bring about the reunion which Arévalo so earnestly desires.

It must be admitted that the essays were written during a period in which Arévalo possessed no anticipation of holding an elective political office. Consequently, there was no real reason why he should try

to formulate a concrete program(s) for bringing about the reunification of the isthmus. At least in setting forth his views on Central America, Arévalo focused attention on the subject. He expressed the existing spirit of the unity of the isthmus when he spoke of Istmania as "nuestra patria." His essays were designed to appeal to the young and to the intellectual community as well as to the various groups in Central America which constantly advocate the reunion of the isthmus. At the same time, he did not antagonize the existing power structure by placing any blame for contemporary failures at reunion. Likewise, he did not seek to embarrass anyone by suggesting means of bringing about the desired reunion. It might also be noted that in "Istmania," Arévalo personally manifests for the first time an "anti-yankee" sentiment which surfaces considerably in later years. Taken as a whole, it is quite obvious that Arévalo's faith in Central American unity "es una fe muy optimista e idealista."²³

²³ Angela Delli Sante-Arrocha, Juan José Arévalo: Pensador Contemporáneo, (Mexico: Costa-Amic, 1962), p. 68.

CHAPTER III

THE PRESIDENTIAL YEARS

In 1944 two Central American dictators, General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in El Salvador and General Jorge Ubico in Guatemala, were toppled from political power. At the time these two events were expected to trigger the downfall--domino-style--of the dictators in the other Central American republics.¹ The advocates of Central American unification believed that the time was ripe for action designed to bring about the reunion of Central America.² Consequently, the various unionist groups held the "Fourth Unionist Convention" on September 15, 1944, in Santa Ana, El Salvador.³ It was at this convention that the resolution was passed which called for a federation between Guatemala and El Salvador. The reasoning behind the proposal was the belief that the remaining Central American countries would join the federation as soon as each overthrew its dictatorship and established a democratic political system.

In the electoral campaign for the presidency in Guatemala, the various unionist groups withdrew their candidates and threw their

¹ Following the downfall of Ubico, this sentiment was expressed in the headlines of articles such as "Now Ubico: next--?" Newsweek, (July 10, 1944), p. 58, and "Two Down..." Inter-American, III (August, 1944), p. 3.

² Alberto Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América (Tragedia y Esperanza), (2nd. ed.; Guatemala: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1963), p. 205.

³ Ibid.

undivided support to Arévalo.⁴ However, the general theme of Central American unity per se played almost no role in the Guatemalan presidential campaign as far as the candidates were concerned. Only twice was the theme of Central American unification reported in the press during the campaign. The first time it was mentioned in a reporter's defining of Arevalismo: "Arevalismo quiere decir liquidar el pasado, es una doctrina nueva que habla de estructura la nueva Centroamerica."⁵ The second time the theme was mentioned was two days later when Arévalo briefly, and without any previous plan to do so, met Doctor Arturo Romero, a presidential candidate in El Salvador who was visiting in Guatemala.⁶ Following the brief encounter, Juan José Orozco, a lawyer, proclaimed that the meeting was the beginning of a union between El Salvador and Guatemala.⁷ It should be noticed that in each instance, the reference made to Central American unity was not by Arévalo but by others. Perhaps one reason why the unity of Central America, including the proposal by the Fourth Unionist Convention, was ignored was a reaction to the general hostility which existed between Guatemala under its three-man junta and El Salvador which had fallen under the control of Colonel Osmin Aguirre y Salinas.⁸ For example, El Salvador charged that the Guatemalan government had aided revolutionists who had crossed

⁴ El Imparcial, October 24, 1944, p. 1.

⁵ Ibid., November 15, 1944, p. 1.

⁶ Ibid., November 17, 1944, p. 1.

⁷ Orozco turned out to be a false prophet as Romero withdrew from the presidential race in El Salvador on December 22, 1944.

⁸ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 205.

the border on December 11 and 12.⁹ Arturo Romero took refuge in Guatemala City, charging that the regime of terror in El Salvador precluded free elections.¹⁰ With the general hostile relationship existing, there was little point in pressing the proposal of a federation between the two republics as a campaign issue. Another reason why the Central American unity theme was ignored during the campaign was due to the feeling of Arévalo that a presidential candidate in any Central American republic who campaigned on a platform stressing Central American unity could not be elected to the office.¹¹

The period extending from the election in December to the presidential inauguration in March was mainly headlined by the writing of a new national constitution under the auspices of the junta. During this three-month period Arévalo maintained his silence as far as the reunion of Central America was concerned, including his address to the nation in February, 1945.¹² Arévalo's silence was finally broken on March 15, 1945, in his inaugural address.¹³ Toward the middle of the address, Arévalo spoke briefly of Central America.¹⁴ He stated that Guatemalans could not celebrate completely the democratic restoration of their country without remembering the rest of Central America. There was no Guatemalan

9

New York Times, December 15, 1944, p. 5.

10

Ibid., December 24, 1944, p. 9. Romero shortly thereafter went to Costa Rica so as not to further embarrass the Guatemalan government.

11

Arévalo, private interview.

12

El Imparcial, February 15, 1945, p. 1.

13

Juan José Arévalo, "Al asumir la Presidencia," in his Discursos En La Presidencia (1945-1948), (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1948), pp. 6-21.

14

Ibid., pp. 12-13.

who did not dream of one great country and who did not look upon a united Central America as a political ideal and as an effective reality. The sentiment of friendship toward the rest of the isthmus on the part of Guatemalans was both profound and sincere. According to Arévalo, Guatemalans did not consider themselves as a complete entity when they remembered that the isthmus still remained divided into five small republics, exposed to the unreasonable hand of personal ambition or the exploitation of the flogging room. Terrible forces separated the isthmus and these forces had been "nuestros propios gobiernos." A Central American federation could be achieved if the governments would put aside their personal interests. In considering Central American unification, some feared having to give up power while others thought only in terms of the power which would result from the construction of a great republic. Both of these thoughts needed to be put aside. The governors of Central American should enter the federation after having renounced all their political ambitions. The Revolutionary Junta of Government for Guatemala had set the example. Central American federation was not a myth, but a possibility which could be achieved in a short period of time. All that was lacking in order for the isthmus to be reunited was for the five presidents each to renounce his presidency, to renounce any future presidential ambitions and to agree to provide absolute electoral freedom. The five presidents could return to the American continent a Central American nation--a great living democracy populated by eight million peaceful citizens, economically powerful and militarily modernized. One could be assured that the Guatemalan people and army would joyfully view, on the bases of cordiality, equality and personal disinterest, the rebirth of such a great nation. However, Arévalo

recognized that such a progressive move was not feasible at the time: "Mientras esperamos la federación, Guatemala, pensando en ella, apresurará como quien dice, el arreglo de su propia casa."¹⁵

As was the case in the two essays written in the 1930's, Arévalo presented no concrete program for bringing about the unification of the isthmus. He reiterated that the major obstacle to federation was the personal interests of the governors of the five republics, among whom he now had to be included, although the implication is clear that he personally possessed none of the disqualifying characteristics. The Arévalo speaking in the inaugural address remained the intellectual who had written the earlier essays. As of yet, he had acquired no political experience in the problems of constructing an isthmanian federation.

In an interview with Luis C. Manjarrez, of Excelsior (Mexico), Arévalo stated that the most important political task after improving the conditions of Guatemalans was to work to bring about the reconstruction of Central America as a great, cultured and democratic nation.¹⁶ He went on to say that his first act as president of Guatemala had been to initiate the essential movement for this great federation of the Central American republics. Arévalo says (1971) that this first act was to talk with Doctor Salvador Mendieta, president of the Partido Unionista Centroamericano, and the planning of a meeting to promote Central American unity by the two men and their associates.¹⁷ In addition,

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁶ El Imparcial, April 4, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁷ Arévalo, private interview.

Arévalo made contact with the other Central American governments. "Y sin ocultar una gran satisfacción, nos indica que las consultas que sobre el particular ha hecho ya a varios gobiernos, han encontrado la más franca simpatía."¹⁸ It would appear that here again Arévalo was over-reacting or else displaying considerable naivete in viewing the responses to his attempt to initiate a unification movement, especially in the light of past experience.

Meanwhile, in El Salvador a one-candidate presidential election had been held. General Salvador Castaneda Castro had been elected president and had also assumed office in March. The Guatemalan government of Arévalo extended recognition to the Castaneda Castro government the following month.¹⁹

San Cristóbal de la Frontera²⁰

In early April, 1945, a committee designated by the Fourth Unionist Convention arrived in Guatemala City.²¹ The purpose of the visit was to deliver to President Arévalo the proclamations passed by the Convention.

¹⁸ El Imparcial, April 4, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁹ New York Times, April 9, 1945, p. 6.

²⁰ There are in Guatemala two towns named San Cristóbal. However, the town at which the meeting was held between Arévalo and Castaneda Castro was San Cristóbal de la Frontera, which is located on the Guatemalan-Salvadorean border, and not San Cristóbal which is located a considerable distance from the border. A number of sources in writing about this meeting usually refer to San Cristóbal, dropping "de la Frontera" either knowingly or through geographical ignorance. In addition, one author placed the San Cristóbal de la Frontera conference at Santa Ana, El Salvador; see Thomas L. Karnes, The Failure of Union: Central America, 1824-1960, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 233.

²¹ El Imparcial, April 11, 1945, pp. 1 and 6.

At approximately the same time, another committee was making a similar presentation to President Castaneda Castro in San Salvador. Both committees expressed great optimism that a union, first of Guatemala and El Salvador, could be achieved and, second, that such a union would lead eventually to the unification of the entire isthmus.

The meeting of May 17, 1945, at San Cristóbal de la Frontera was arranged by the Central American Patriotic Union and two of its affiliates.²² The Central American Patriotic Union was headed by Doctor Fernando E. Sandoval and Señor Juan Petrilli. The Santa Ana affiliate was presided over by Doctors Daniel Aleguá and Gustavo E. Alvarez while the Sonsonate affiliate was headed by Roberto Matheu, an engineer.

The conference of San Cristóbal de Frontera brought together President Juan José Arévalo of Guatemala and President Salvador Castaneda Castro of El Salvador for a one-day meeting. Each president was accompanied by members of his cabinet, advisors and various aides. During the conference, Arévalo issued a press release concerning the meeting.²³ In the news release Arévalo paid tribute to the work involved in arranging the historic conference. Arévalo said that the unionist groups were well qualified for the task in that they had personal knowledge of each president and were fully aware of the presidents' sympathy for the unity of the isthmus. The major part of the

²² Ibid., May 18, 1945, pp. 1 and 11, 1 and 7. The statement by Karnes that Arévalo initiated the conference is somewhat misleading since it fails to take into account the role played by the Central American unionist groups. Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 233. Men-dieta was not in attendance because he had fallen ill. Arévalo, private interview.

²³ El Imparcial, May 18, 1945, pp. 1 and 7.

meeting, according to Arévalo, was devoted to studying a plan for the "progressive federation" of the two states. The initial plan was set forth by Arévalo himself but was altered by suggestions put forth by Castaneda Castro. Both presidents agreed that the federation was a necessity and should be pressed for the aggrandizement of the people of Central America. Each president was to promptly notify his country's delegates at the San Francisco Conference (United Nations), as well as at the next Pan American Conference, to work to secure international recognition that the federation of the five Central American republics was a necessity, both from the viewpoint of the region and from that of the continent. At the same time, the diplomatic representatives of Guatemala and El Salvador were to be given instructions to work in conjunction with each other in the foreign countries to which they were accredited. Arévalo, in addition, obtained a promise from Castaneda Castro that he would issue a special declaration favorable to Guatemala concerning the question of Belice.

Arévalo, at the San Cristóbal de la Frontera conference, proposed a plan of evolutionary or "progressive federation." The idea of a "progressive federation" was original with Arévalo and one to which he had given considerable thought in the years preceding his election as president.²⁴ The plan called for a federation between Guatemala and El Salvador in the beginning.²⁵ After a period of five to ten years of existence, the federation would be expanded to include Honduras. After another period of from five to ten years of the three-member federation,

²⁴Arévalo, private interview.

²⁵Arévalo, unpublished typed statement, p. 3.

then Nicaragua would be brought into the federation. After Nicaragua had been duly incorporated during a similar period of time, Costa Rica would be included and at that point Central American unity would be a reality. Thus, Arévalo envisioned the gradual or progressive expansion of the two-state federation into a unified Central America, permitting ample time for problems to be worked out in the process. This he felt was the only possible way for Central American unification to be achieved. As he stated, "Considera muy difícil que se llegue de golpe a una Federación de los cinco Estados en un solo acto."²⁶

The major outcome of the conference was the creation of various joint technical commissions, each of which was designated a specific area to study and for which it was to prepare unification plans.²⁷ Joint technical commissions were appointed for areas such as a federal constitution, army and police, education, laws, treasury, monetary systems, foreign relations, and customs and tariffs. The joint commissions were given the date of September 15, 1945, as the date for submitting their proposals to the respective governments.

Arévalo and Castaneda Castro also reached general agreement on several other matters.²⁸ It was agreed that under the federation, each state would retain its own autonomy and its own Congress. There would be created a Federal Senate and representation in the Senate would be based on the equality of member-states. Each president would agree to resign and would renounce categorically any possible candidacy for the

²⁶
Ibid.

²⁷
Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 205.

²⁸
Ibid., p. 206.

federation presidency within the next ten years. This particular prohibition would also apply to the president of each Central American nation which might later join the federation. It was specifically agreed that the pact would be left open in order to permit and encourage the other nations of the isthmus to join whenever they so desired. And, finally, it was agreed that a Federal Constituent Assembly would meet on September 15, 1946, to approve the Federal Constitution which would be prepared in the meantime.

Arévalo and Castaneda Castro also generally agreed upon the desirability to take immediate action in certain areas.²⁹ The two heads of state agreed on the immediate need for free commerce between their two nations, the abolition of passports and the creation of a joint merchant marine. In addition, they appointed a Federal Council, consisting of three representatives from each nation in attendance at the conference, which was to have its headquarters in Santa Ana, El Salvador, and which would coordinate the activities of the federation movement.

Shortly after the San Cristóbal de la Frontera conference, Arévalo delivered a radio address concerning the meeting.³⁰ He called the meeting the first step toward federation and expressed considerable optimism over the prospect of its success.

Vamos a la Federación porque es la única garantía de supervivencia para estos pueblos chicos que pueden ser convertidos en colonias al primer zarpazo de algún imperio naciente y vamos a la Federación

²⁹

Ibid.

³⁰ "Con motivo de la Entrevista de San Cristóbal," in Arévalo, Discursos, pp. 30-42. It might be noted that pages 30-36 of the address comprised a report to the people regarding the activities of Arévalo's government to that date.

porque los pueblos centroamericanos así lo han querido siempre, sin haber encontrado jamás en sus gobernantes la grandeza de ánimo y el desinterés para realizarla.³¹

Arévalo further stated in his radio address that at that time the projected federation would consist only of Guatemala and El Salvador in order to simplify the difficulties and to consolidate the foundation. The other states of Central America would be invited to join the federation after Guatemala and El Salvador had been able to obtain practical and definitive results. The federation was being undertaken in light of the experience gained from past failures. Nothing was to be destroyed. Each state would maintain its autonomy, its own Congress, its own Constitution, and its own fundamental institutions. The federation would create only those institutions designed to regulate and administer common interests or activities of the member-states, developing a politics of progressive unity in all areas. The process was not to be a hurried one, but would occur only after various officials, specialists and groups had been consulted. The attempt would be made to devise a federal system which had been well thought out and which was satisfactory for all. The only steps which would be undertaken shortly, Arévalo continued, would be the disappearance of the economic and political frontiers which had divided the two countries for over a hundred years.

After the federation program had been initially prepared, revised and approved, only then would the federation become a reality. The federation would be organized without disrupting the existing governments in each nation. The presidents of Guatemala and El Salvador would become governors of their respective states and serve until the end of the

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Ibid., pp. 36-37.

term to which they had been elected. Arévalo noted that each president had agreed to renounce any immediate federal presidential ambitions. Each president would return to the frontier within forty days to approve additional new steps toward the federation. The federation of Central America, according to Arévalo, was not a governmental whim but represented an earnest desire, a necessity, a popular affliction.

After paying tribute to the armed forces, especially to Major Francisco Javier Arana and Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzman--who had accompanied him to the conference--Arévalo then turned his attention to the citizens of the other Central American republics. First, he spoke directly to the citizens of El Salvador.³² He stated that his unionist sentiment was not of recent origin. Arévalo claimed that such sentiment was kindled in him from the benches of the primary school. He lived and contributed with juvenile ardor to the 1921 attempt at federation and suffered terrible bitterness when it was destroyed by personal ambitions. But now the situation had changed. Through the efforts of the presidents of the two countries the dream was about to become a reality.

Ahora que los gobernantes hemos superado la etapa del egoísmo, vamos a satisfacer el clamor popular de hace un siglo e incorporaremos a los códigos penales un nuevo delito: el ser separatista.³³

Arévalo next directed comments to the people of Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua.³⁴ He informed them that both he and President Castaneda Castro dreamed of the day when they would be part of the federation. The proposed federation would permit their countries to join later. The

³² Ibid., pp. 39-41.

³³ Ibid., pp. 40-41.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 41-42.

adopted plan of action was more modest in its beginning but more grandiose in its projections. The federation currently being organized would not disintegrate like all of the other attempts. A new era had arrived, not only in the world, but also in Central America.

Unforeseen by Arévalo and Castaneda Castro, or else because of what they chose to ignore, events did not turn out as envisioned. All of the joint commissions were not organized.³⁵ Some of the commissions, such as the one on education, organized and reported with little difficulty; other commissions, such as the one concerning the treasury departments, managed to organize and report but only under severe handicaps. At about the same time, the unionist movement suffered a split within its ranks and was no longer able to give solidified support to the attempt at federation.

For the remainder of the year and during roughly the first eight months of 1946, the attempt to bring about the federation between Guatemala and El Salvador floundered. Most of the joint commissions met and proceeded in attempting to draw up proposed plans for unifying the various sectors of the two countries. In June, 1945, the foreign press was filled with favorable reports concerning the successes of the attempted federation. On June 6 it was reported in Mexico City that Guatemala and El Salvador had become one country.³⁶ Señor Carlos Zachrisso, the Guatemalan Chargé d'affaires in Mexico City, announced:

The Guatemalan-Salvadorean frontier no longer exists. Troops have been withdrawn and passports are not needed. We have become one people, with the same language, religion and problems. We are aiming at progress and equality in the social, political and

³⁵ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 206.

³⁶ New York Times, June 7, 1945, p. 6.

economic fields.³⁷

At the same time, Señor Armando López, the Salvadorean Chargé d'affaires, announced that "both presidents will resign" and that "later on there will be elections appointing men who will be simply Governors of a federated Central American Republic."³⁸ This directly contradicts what Arévalo had said concerning the fate of the two incumbent presidents. However, nothing resulted from these evidently premature announcements.

At a meeting of the Central American Unionist Party held in August, 1945, resolutions were passed calling for the unification of Central America. The convention specifically took notice of the Arévalo-Castaneda Castro conference at San Cristóbal de la Frontera and called for more energetic action to achieve the proposals of the May 17 conference.

However, domestic problems both in Guatemala and in El Salvador can probably be blamed for the lack of success during the last part of 1945 and, in fact, during the rest of Arévalo's administration. Both Arévalo and Castaneda Castro faced political crises at this time. During most of the summer of 1945, Castaneda Castro was occupied with internal disturbances.³⁹ One problem, according to Arévalo, which constantly plagued Castaneda Castro was the opposition of the El Salvadorean military to the proposed federation with Guatemala.⁴⁰ The aristocratic El Salvadorean military was especially opposed to merging with the more

³⁷
Ibid.

³⁸
Ibid.

³⁹
Karnes, The Failure of Union, pp. 234-235.

⁴⁰
Arévalo, private interview.

democratic and revolutionary Guatemalan military. By October, the first of numerous attempted coups against Arévalo's government occurred. Arévalo spent most of his first year in office attempting to consolidate his own political position within Guatemala. One reporter claimed that Arévalo was "trying hard to organize some personal support by booming the Central American Federation."⁴¹ There may or may not be some truth to this assertion, but Arévalo did push heavily the theme of Central American unity during approximately the first year of his administration.⁴² However, in a speech to the Guatemalan Congress in early March, 1946, Arévalo only briefly touched on the theme of Central American unification.⁴³ The President recalled the conference at San Cristóbal de la Frontera between Castaneda Castro and himself. He expressed the view that with the overwhelming reception of the success achieved at that conference, they should be able to move forward in reconstructing "la patria grande" at their next meeting. Commencing in 1946 and gaining steam in 1947, the emphasis on Central American unity was replaced by a different theme which possessed a greater emotional arousal on the part of Guatemalans--the question of Belice.

Santa Ana

The next conference called to consider the topic of Central American unification was once again not at the complete initiative of either

⁴¹ "Guatemala, Full Circle," Inter-American, IV (August, 1945), p. 9.

⁴² Arévalo himself claims that this was not the case as he had all the popular support that he needed. Arévalo, private interview.

⁴³ El Imparcial, March 1, 1946, pp. 1 and 2.

Arévalo or Castaneda Castro.⁴⁴ The setting for the conference could not have been more appropriate. It occurred on the 125th anniversary of the independence of Central America. The conference was held in Santa Ana, El Salvador--a city which was "uno de los más unionistas del istmo."⁴⁵ Invitations for the conference were sent out on September 9, 1946, to the presidents of the five Central American republics by Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero, an ardent internationalist and president of the International Court of Justice.⁴⁶ The illustrious Salvadorean citizen invited the presidents to meet at his home in Santa Ana on September 12. Dr. Guerrero requested the presidents to send a delegate authorized to represent his country and to sign any agreement reached at the conference if the president could not personally attend the meeting for some reason.⁴⁷

Only two Central American presidents attended the Santa Ana meeting. President Arévalo of Guatemala attended in person and was accompanied by several members of his cabinet, including Eugenio Silva Peña, Minister of Foreign Relations; Francisco Valdés Calderón, Minister of Government; Clemente Marroquín Rojas, Minister of Economics and Labor; and Major Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, Minister of National Defense.⁴⁸ General Salvador Castaneda Castro was also present to represent El Salvador. President (General) Tiburcio Carías expressed sympathy with the purpose of the

⁴⁴ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 207.

⁴⁵ José Rafael Castro, Política Internacional de Guatemala, (Habana: n.p., 1951), p. 98.

⁴⁶ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 207.

⁴⁷ El Imparcial, September 10, 1946, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Ibid., September 11, 1946, p. 1

meeting but noted that he could not leave Honduras without the permission of Congress, which was then in recess.⁴⁹ President Teodoro Picado of Costa Rica was traveling in the provinces and the invitation did not reach him in time.⁵⁰ President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua was reported ill and could not attend and did not send a representative in his place.⁵¹

At the conclusion of the Santa Ana conference, Presidents Arévalo and Castaneda Castro signed a pact between their respective countries.⁵² The first portion of the pact consisted of fundamental declaration of policy. The pact declared that peace was the basis for such political action. The principle of nonintervention in the internal life of any state was firmly reiterated. The presidents declared that they would procure by all vigorous means a democratic life, freely determined by the people respectively. By working through a system of consultation, they affirmed that they would confirm the spirit of fraternal collaboration

⁴⁹ Ibid., September 13, 1946, p. 1.

⁵⁰ Karnes maintains that Julio Acosta, Minister of Foreign Relations represented Costa Rica at the Santa Ana conference. Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 235. However, this student has been unable to substantiate this contention. The reporting of El Imparcial (September 13, 1946, p. 1) does not mention Acosta, but only that Picado did not attend the conference because he did not receive the invitation in time. Likewise, Arévalo in his speech at Santa Ana on September 12, 1946, states that neither the presidents nor representatives of the presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua were present. Arévalo, "En el Palacio Municipal de Santa Ana después de firmar el Convenio con el Presidente de El Salvador" in his Discursos, pp. 131-132. Arévalo reiterated this view when interviewed by this student. Arévalo, private interview.

⁵¹ El Imparcial, September 13, 1946, p. 1.

⁵² See Appendix I for a copy of this pact signed on September 12, 1946, by the two presidents and subsequently ratified by the Congress in each of the two nations.

and solidarity which inspired them. They declared that they would intensify the culture of their people and would place special emphasis upon combating illiteracy. Finally, the pact declared that one of the major goals was the implementation of suitable social legislation which would guarantee the legitimate interests of capital and labor within a spirit of justice and democratic principles. The first section of the pact concluded with the declaration that the five Central American republics were destined by their nature, history and the evident desire of their people to form anew one nation and that this aspiration would be pursued.

The second section of the Santa Ana pact consisted of the basic proposals to which the two signatories had agreed. The presidents agreed to proceed to the immediate study of the conditions under which it would be possible to realize the unity of their people with a view to preparing the political unification of all Central America. They agreed to entrust this study to a mixed commission composed of three members designated by the president of each of the signatory nations, with the addition of a similar number of commission members for each additional nation which might later agree to adhere to the pact. The said commission would commence its work in San Salvador on December 1, 1946. Prior to the December date, the pact would be presented to each Congress respectively for ratification. The commission thus created would present its findings prior to March 1, 1947, and its report would then be acted upon by all interested governments. The pact further stated that its contents and any agreements which eventually were derived from it would in no way affect the international agreements reached at Chapultepec and San Francisco. The pact would remain open so as to permit the governments of

Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua to become signatory participants should they desire to do so. Finally, the document was to be signed in duplicate and a copy would be deposited with each Foreign Ministry and the pact would be registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations. The pact was then signed by the Presidents and Foreign Ministers of Guatemala and El Salvador.⁵³ The pact was never signed by any of the other three Central American republics.

Following the signing of the pact on September 12, 1946, Arévalo delivered a speech in which he said that the work initiated and outlined at San Cristóbal de la Frontera was being concluded.⁵⁴ He referred to the crime committed by past generations in dividing Central America into five republics. However, that crime was not to be castigated at the present because the men who committed it no longer existed. What could be castigated were those who clung to the idea of separatism, those who desired and preferred to maintain a poor and backward disunited Central America.

In moments, such as at Santa Ana, Arévalo continued, the hour had arrived for political definitions because the time was right to attend to the urgent calling of the great human community. The presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua were not represented, but the people

⁵³ Karnes also declared that "Santa Ana was proclaimed the capital of Central America." Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 235. This student has been unable to substantiate this claim. What Karnes is evidently referring to is Arévalo's declaration that "Santa Ana, por su historia y por su calidad social, está llamada a ser la capital de la futura Centro-america." El Imparcial, September 13, 1946, p. 1. However, this was a statement made by Arévalo and was not included in the pact signed at Santa Ana. Arévalo feels that in the event of a federation between El Salvador and Guatemala the capital should be Santa Ana. Arévalo, private interview.

⁵⁴ "En el Palacio Municipal de Santa Ana," Discursos, pp. 127-133.

of these nations were represented in the person of a great Central American, Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero.

Continuing, Arévalo maintained that the talks at Santa Ana did not contain a feeling of political partisanship but instead represented a time to initiate a movement of much greater proportion. What was involved was a question of historical recovery, a question of social ties and elevated interests. From San Cristóbal de la Frontera to Santa Ana, the Presidents of El Salvador and Guatemala had faced the entire gamut of the zoological scale of separatism designed to prevent the fulfillment of the decisions reached. From San Cristóbal de Frontera to Santa Ana, the two Presidents had acquired a very valuable experience. Therefore, it could be said that henceforth the Presidents would overcome all the obstacles in order to reach the final goal. Now the two presidents were guided by a man to whom political interests were alien. It was fortunate that such an illustrious citizen of the world had arrived at that particular time.

The "illustrious citizen of the world" to whom Arévalo referred was, of course, Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero. Here, really for the first time, Arévalo brought in another person to share the spotlight. It was as if Arévalo was grasping in an effort to strengthen the unification movement which until then had not really accomplished very much outside of the conferences of San Cristóbal de la Frontera and Santa Ana. In fact, the relations between Guatemala and El Salvador were not entirely cordial even at this time.

The Congress of El Salvador ratified the Santa Ana agreement on October 2, 1946.⁵⁵ The Congress of Guatemala, home of the Central

⁵⁵
El Imparcial, October 3, 1946, p. 1.

Americanist Arévalo, delayed ratification until November 19, 1946.⁵⁶

Pact of 1947

The months following the conference at Santa Ana were not the most ideal for bringing about a federation between Guatemala and El Salvador. In September riots broke out in El Salvador and martial law had to be declared.⁵⁷ For a time it was not clear who headed the government in El Salvador as reports reached Guatemala that Castaneda Castro had been ousted, then reinstated but forced to share power with a junta, and finally that Castaneda Castro was in full control once again.⁵⁸ This chaotic picture of El Salvador's internal politics is reinforced by Arévalo's contention that Castaneda Castro found his efforts promoting Central American unity restricted by the opposition of the El Salvadorean military.⁵⁹

As a result of the unstable political conditions, the joint commission charged with preparing a project constitution for the proposed federation did not meet until January 21, 1947.⁶⁰ One of the very first actions of the commission was to extend invitations to Costa Rica, Honduras

⁵⁶ José Luís Mendoza, comp., Tratados y Convenciones Internacionales Vigentes Para Guatemala V. IV: Pactos Bilaterales, (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, para el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1960), p. 235.

⁵⁷ El Imparcial, September 26, 1946, p. 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid., September 27, 1946, p. 1.

⁵⁹ Arévalo, private interview.

⁶⁰ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 207. Arévalo states that he gave no specific instructions to the Guatemalan delegates as he had selected them on the basis of their ability, knowledge and experience. Arévalo, private interview.

and Nicaragua to adhere to the Santa Ana pact and to designate their members to the commission.⁶¹ However, nothing came of this initiative by the commission. At the initial meeting of the joint commission the question was raised as to whether the commission should proceed to study a plan for the immediate union of the states or whether, on the contrary, to plan an evolutionary form of federation. The commission ultimately decided to prepare a study which adhered to the evolutionary federation theme. The result was the "Pacto de Unión Confederada de los Estados de Centro América."⁶² The project was based on proposals which had developed out of past experience and new propositions which expressed the aspirations of the Central American people at the present time. It was designed only for a five-year period, after which it envisioned the adoption of a constitution which would provide for the complete unification of the states.

Since the proposed pact was the culmination of efforts by Arévalo to bring about the unification of Central America, the proposed federation project should be examined in detail. The projected constitution contained forty articles. Articles I through X contained general declarations in regard to establishing the federation, or more accurately a confederation. Much of this had been dealt with at San Cristóbal de la Frontera and later at Santa Ana. Article I provided that the Central American governments agree to the preliminary character of a Confederate Union of Central American States which would be achieved through a series of progressions

⁶¹ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro America, p. 207.

⁶² Alberto Herrarte, Documentos de la Unión Centroamericana, (Guatemala: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1957), pp. 355-367. A copy of the Pact of 1947 is to be found as Appendix II.

as outlined in the pact. Article II reiterated that no state would give up its autonomy and would maintain independence in its internal affairs. The political constitution of each state would continue in effect while the federation government was being organized and would continue in effect as long as no conflict arose between it and the constitution of the Republic of Central America. Article III provided that each state would retain its republican, democratic and representative system of government and that the same form of governmental system would be carried over to the federal union. Each state, according to Article IV, was prohibited from intervening in the affairs of each of the other states and was obligated to permit disputes to be settled by the Central American Court of Justice which was to be created for this specific function. Article V bestowed federation citizenship upon all citizens of the individual states which joined and assured them the same rights and protection. Article VI provided for the free and uninhibited travel, without the necessity of passports, between member-states, with the only requirements being an identification document. Article VII provided that persons who had obtained professional licences to practice in one state would enjoy the same right in the other states except that such persons would be required to authenticate their credentials, present proper identification and show capacity to practice the profession in the state which granted the license. Article VIII provided that the public acts of one state would be valid in the other states as well. Article IX provided that the judicial decisions of one state would be considered valid in all. Article X held that merchant ships of member-states would be treated as national ships in all ports of the federation and would enjoy the same rights and be subject to the same regulations.

The second division of the project, Article XI, was concerned with the purposes or goals to be achieved through a series of actions to be undertaken by the states which had agreed to adhere to the pact of union. Section one called for each state to respond with all its vigor to the definitive reorganization of the Central American nation according to the terms of the pact. Second, each state was called upon to include an essentially Central American character in its popular education, making it more thorough, practical and complete as possible with modern pedagogical techniques. Third, the states were to develop free commerce between themselves and expand it as much as possible to make it more active and profitable; the states would also promote the foreign commerce of Central America. Fourth, they were to increase and further secure the credit of the member-states as well as the agricultural and industrial sectors from the viewpoint of the common benefit for all. Fifth, the states would gradually provide for uniformity in civil, commercial and criminal legislation, respecting property and the most absolute consecration of the rights of human beings. Included within the realm of uniform legislation were systems of customs, money, weights, measures and general sanitation, especially the sanitation of the ports. Sixth, a merchant marine would be established for trading between ports within the federation and with foreign countries. Seventh, the states would provide for the common defense of the Central American states against aggression and would cooperate with the United Nations in securing the peace when called upon to do so by that organization. Eighth, the states would endeavor to see that radio-telegraphic, air, maritime and railway communications and transportation were always expeditious so that they could be used and enjoyed by persons and commerce without any

natural hindrance or impediment. Ninth, the states would undertake at the most opportune time the task of acquiring diplomatic recognition of the federation by the nations of the continent. And, lastly, the states would implement suitable social legislation which amply guaranteed the legitimate interests of capital and labor, within a spirit of justice and agreement with authentic democratic principles.

The third major section of the project was devoted to the organizational apparatus of the federation. Article XII provided that there would be created a National Diet, an Executive Delegation and a Central American Court of Justice.

The National Diet was provided for in Articles XIII-XV of the project. Each state which subscribed to the pact, or which later decided to adhere to it, would have five permanent and five alternate members, to be elected by that state's legislative body. The duties of the National Diet, Article XIII continued, would include: (1) providing regulations for internal order; (2) approve or modify the annual budgets for the federation's expenses as submitted by the Executive Delegation; (3) approve or disapprove expense accounts of the Executive Delegation annually; (4) emit resolutions which fall within the confines of the pact and which were solicited by the Executive Delegation; (5) formulate amendments to the federal constitution and to constituent laws and submit the same for consideration to the National Constituent Assembly; (6) formulate the bases for the election of deputies to the National Constituent Assembly; (7) convoke the people for said elections and provide all that was indispensable for the solemn inauguration of the National Constituent Assembly which was to meet at the very latest on September 15, 1952; and (8) declare if there was a need to provide for crimes attributed

to any member of the federation's organs.

Article XIV provided that members of the National Diet would continue in office until the National Constituent Assembly was installed. Article XV prohibited the National Diet from augmenting or diminishing the obligations imposed on each state under the terms of the pact. However, on its own initiative, or on petition by the Executive Delegation, the National Diet could modify provisions of a secondary nature if there existed necessities or conveniences as shown by experience, but the National Diet may not so act until the pact had been in effect for one year. Before such modifications could be considered valid, the National Diet had to obtain a ruling from the Central American Court of Justice that they did not contravene the bases of the pact. In case the Court decided that a proposed modification was in direct contravention of the pact, it would also declare the reasoning behind its judgment. If the decision of the Court was favorable, the National Diet could proclaim--by a two-thirds vote of its members--that the modification was then a part of the pact and binding on all members.

Articles XVI-XIX provided for the Executive Delegation. The Executive Delegation, according to Article XVI, would be composed of one permanent and one alternate member named by each member-state. If Guatemala and El Salvador were the sole members, representation would be doubled for each state. The delegates thus selected, according to Article XVII, would serve until the National Constituent Assembly was installed as provided for in the pact. Upon assuming their duties, the members would draw lots to select one of their members to act as presiding officer during the first six months. This process would continue for each following six-month period but excluding the current

presiding delegate from the selection process.

Article XVIII provided that the Executive Delegation would name a Coordinator for each state in the federation. The Coordinator would be responsible for working with his designated state in an effort to reach by common consent the better and more convenient methods of realizing the studies and positions formulated by the Executive Delegation and affecting that state. The Coordinator would also act as the representative of the Executive Delegation to his respective government and would enjoy as such diplomatic immunity.

The indispensable studies necessary for the definitive implementation of the federation and the most important goals to be obtained were found in Article XIX. These included: (1) unification of the diplomatic and consular services; (2) unification of customs; (3) establishment of free commerce between the states of the federation; (4) unification of the monetary systems and the national banks; (5) coordination of the tax systems in fiscal matters; (6) adjustment of tariffs and payments; (7) formation of a national merchant marine; (8) whatever other matter of economic character, of equal general interest, which the federation could undertake under the powers granted the federation; (9) gradual unification of the military and an integrated General Staff; (10) unification of education, with textbooks designed to imprint an eminently Central American character and propaganda to intensify love of "la Patria Grande;" and (11) unification of civil, commercial, criminal, mineral and labor legislation.

The Central American Court of Justice was established under the provisions of Articles XX-XXVII. Article XX provided that the Central American Court of Justice would be a permanent tribunal charged with

settling questions and controversies of whatever nature or origin which arose between the states and which the governments had not been successful in reconciling. Further, the Court would have jurisdiction, according to Article XXI, in: cases involving a protest by a state or by an organ of the federation regarding violations of the pact; cases brought by an individual(s) of a state against another contracting government which fell under international law and after all recourse had been exhausted within the state; and cases arising between contracting governments and individuals.

Article XXII provided that the Court would be organized with five permanent and ten alternate members with the Congress of each state electing one permanent and two alternate members from among six candidates recommended by the state's Supreme Court of Justice. The candidates would have to be jurists of that state and possess high moral standards and professional competence. The same article also made the Court a truly Central American Court in providing for the selection of the members in the event not all five countries joined the federation. If only four states joined the federation, the four judges selected by these states would elect the fifth member and two alternates from among the jurists of the non-participating state. If agreement could not be reached, the decision would be by the drawing of lots. If only three states joined the federation, the elected judges of the Court would select one member and two alternates from each of the two non-participating states. In the event that only two republics adhered to the pact, the Congress of each contracting state would designate one member and two alternates from a different non-participating state. The four selected judges would then select the fifth member and two alternates from the

fifth and unrepresented state. In all cases, the members and alternates had to possess the necessary qualifications.

Each year the members of the Court would designate one of their own number as a presiding judge. Article XXIII further stipulated that the selection process each year would exclude the current presiding judge. The Court would also be responsible for formulating its own rules and orders of procedure. Article XXIV declared that the Court represented the national conscience of Central America and that the members of the Court should not be inhibited in the exercise of their responsibilities because of an interest which they had in a case due to the state from which it originated. In case of exceptions or the implication of other motives, the rules of the Court should cope conveniently with it. According to Article XXV, in matters of fact the Court should judge according to its free valuation. In matters of law, the Court would be bound by the principles of international law, or where this was not sufficient, by the doctrines of law in general, and in the absence of these, by good sense and natural reason. Sentence should fall on the litigated things or questions and in the manner in which they had been disputed.

Article XXVI provided that in executing the provisions granted in its sphere of power, the Central American Court of Justice ought to work with the Tribunals of Justice of the contracting states. Also, the Court should name special commissions in order to achieve assiduity, when it judged it opportune to do so, and in such cases should solicit the cooperation and aid of the government. The contracting governments promised to obey and cause to be obeyed the decisions of the Court, lending all aid which was necessary for the best and most prompt

execution of such decisions.

The Court, according to Article XXVII, could extend its jurisdiction to the non-contracting states in three instances: cases submitted by a non-contracting state between itself and a member-state, provided the question had not been previously discussed and remained pending in status quo; non-contracting states could by common agreement submit differences of whatever nature or origin between themselves to the Court; and, questions referred to in Article XXI, sections two and three, by common agreement between the parties involved could be heard by the Court.

The final major division of the projected pact for Central American unification contained Articles XXVIII-XL, miscellaneous general provisions. Article XXVIII provided that the Central American states subscribing to the pact obligated themselves to support and carry out its principles and stipulations and any infraction of the pact would result in the state being brought before the Central American Court of Justice. Article XXIX declared that if one or more states adopted the pact with reservations, it would be admitted to the federation only by a majority vote of the National Diet and the reservations would effect only the said state. All states not adhering to the pact were considered as non-members but with the right to join at a later date. Article XXX provided that a minority of the members of the organs established by the pact, meeting in the city of Santa Ana, could make the necessary decisions for the concurrence of the other members. The organs, once they were fully organized, would determine the place of residence to insure for the most convenience. The budgets, travels and salaries of the members would be determined by the government of the state which selected them

and said government would also be responsible for payment thereof.

Article XXXI provided that the organs acting together could change the place of residence when they thought it convenient. Members of the federal government would enjoy the same immunities granted to the state's governmental officials and would enjoy the immunities and privileges of diplomatic agents when in the other contracting states. Article XXXII declared incompatible the exercise of duties by members of the National Diet, the Executive Delegation and the Central American Court of Justice with any other public function, and for members of the Court, with the exercise of a profession. The same disqualifications would apply to the alternates when they were exercising such federal functions. Article XXXIII provided that the budgetary expenses common to the federation would be paid on an equal basis by the contracting states who should make available the established funds to each organ six months in advance. Article XXXIV provided that in case of the resignation, death or disability of a member of an organ of the federation, it would proceed in the shortest time to the designation of the substitute as provided for in the pact. Article XXXV declared that from the day they commenced their functions, the organs of the federation ought to establish the flag and coat-of-arms of the old Union of Central American in order to make use of them and their authority. Article XXXVI provided that the contracting states declare among themselves the free trade of their products. The Executive Delegation would designate by agreement with the governments of the contracting states the products excluded from free trade due to special circumstances in each state and would prepare a formal uniform customs system. Article XXXVII provided that the contracting parties would devote special attention to intensifying among

themselves and with the non-contracting Central American states the development of terrestrial communications, maritime, railroads and aviation. They would maintain their frontiers and ports available for the transit of people and merchandise and expedite postal, telegraphic, radio-telegraphic and telephonic communications. The contracting states would take steps to reach the necessary agreements in order to complete the Pan American Highway and sponsor tourist attractions with the object of developing reciprocal knowledge between the inhabitants of the states of the federation. Article XXXVIII provided that if the governments of the states agreed that a definitive union could be achieved before the five-year period of the pact expired, they could hasten the said union by petitioning the National Diet to convoke the National Constituent Assembly in order to formulate a fundamental charter for the nation. Article XXXIX declared that the present pact would be registered by the contracting parties with the Secretary General of the United Nations and would not adversely affect international agreements in effect.⁶³ Article XL provided that the pact would be submitted to the states for their approval and once approved notification would be forwarded to the respective foreign offices previously agreed upon. If additional states joined later, they would notify the appropriate organ of their decision to adhere to the pact and notice would then be sent to all contracting states of the addition of the new contracting partner. The pact was approved by the mixed commission on April 8, 1947.

The proposed pact was never ratified by a single Central American

⁶³ Registration with the Secretary General--as provided in Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations--did not occur since the pact never went into actual effect. Personal communication of March 8, 1971, from Señor Roberto Lavalle, Guatemalan Legal Officer assigned to the United Nations.

republic and appears not to have been given serious consideration, not even in Guatemala.⁶⁴ In Guatemala the controversy over Belice once again ignited into open flames and the government of Arévalo appeared intent on flaming the emotional fires during roughly the next two years.⁶⁵ In 1948 the Arévalo government experienced a change in United States Ambassador, with the popular Edwin J. Kyle being replaced by the more recalcitrant and ardent American business supporter, Richard C. Patterson, Jr. At approximately the same time, Costa Rica became involved in a civil war and with the coming to power of the revolutionary junta, there were constant border conflicts with Nicaragua. The time for an attempt at the reunion of Central America was just not appropriate.⁶⁶

The possibility of a Central American union next appeared in the press in November, 1948.⁶⁷ The short article contended that there was a possibility that the presidents of the five Central American republics might meet, but there was no official word on such a proposed conference.

⁶⁴ Arévalo maintains that the Pact of 1947 did not require official ratification by any legislative body as it was a project and not a law or treaty. Arévalo, private interview. However, this contention is in direct conflict with Article XL which requires the constitutional ratification by the Legislative Assembly of each state.

⁶⁵ Arévalo maintains that his government, as was the case of any Guatemalan government, was required by Article II of the Constitution to take action on the Belice. Once again, he claims that he had no need to use the question to gain political support as he already had all the support he needed. Arévalo, private interview.

⁶⁶ Arévalo was asked: "From April, 1947, to March, 1951, did you make any other attempt to achieve Central American unity?" His reply was no, because the political situation in the Central American republics was not favorable to such an endeavor. Ibid.

⁶⁷ El Imparcial, November 19, 1948, p. 1.

In early December it was announced that the meeting was being planned for mid-December.⁶⁸ Finally, President Salvador Castaneda Castro of El Salvador announced that he would convene such a meeting in San Salvador.⁶⁹ He included with his announcement a proposed agenda for the meeting. Arévalo, when the reports of a possible meeting began circulating, ordered the 1947 proposed pact to be published and declared that if the governments wanted to move firmly toward unification, they should ratify it.⁷⁰ According to reports in El Imparcial, Arévalo was not in Guatemala City when President Castaneda Castro announced the convening of the conference.⁷¹ A presidential spokesman said that the Guatemalan President was not due to return to the capital city until the proposed date of the conference. Therefore, Arévalo would not be able to attend the meeting. However, the proposed meeting of the presidents never occurred as President Castaneda Castro was ousted from the presidency on December 12, 1948. This ended completely all attempts at the unification of Central America for the duration of Arévalo's presidency.⁷²

The Pact of 1947 in Historical Perspective

The pact prepared by the joint commission and presented to the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador in April, 1947, suffered

⁶⁸ Ibid., December 6, 1948, p. 1.

⁶⁹ Ibid., December 9, 1948, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 210. Arévalo says that such a meeting would have been fruitless as most of the other presidents were not sincerely interested in forming a Central American federation. Arévalo, private interview.

⁷¹ El Imparcial, December 11, 1948, p. 1.

⁷² The reader is referred back to footnote 66.

the same fate as numerous such proposals of the past. In the case of some of the earlier pacts, however, the countries participating in their writing at least ratified the finished product.

The only concrete success in creating a federation composed of all five Central American countries was achieved with the formation of the Federal Republic of Central America in 1824. Under the terms of the federation's Constitution, the republic was a popular, representative and federal government (Article 9).⁷³ The member states retained their freedom and independence in their internal affairs and enjoyed all authority not specifically delegated to the federal government (Article 10). The legislative power was vested in a Congress and a Senate (Articles 55-105). The membership of each house was popularly elected. The real legislative authority of the federation was vested in the Congress, whose membership was based on population--which made Guatemala the predominant power in the Congress. The Senate membership was based on the equality of states--two from each state with one being an ecclesiastic--but did not enjoy full legislative parity with the Congress. It was the duty of the Senate to sanction or refuse to sanction bills passed by the Congress. However, the Congress could repass bills over the Senate's opposition.⁷⁴ The Constitution further provided for the popular election of a president and vice president (Articles 106-128). The president could not serve more than two consecutive four-year terms (Article 111). The

⁷³ Miguel Angel Gallardo, comp., Cuatro Constituciones Federales de Centro América y las Constituciones Políticas de El Salvador, (San Salvador: Tipografía La Unión, 1945), pp. 1-20.

⁷⁴ The legislative operation of the Federal Republic seems to most closely resemble the current practice of the Parliament in England.

president was not provided with the veto power. The Constitution also provided for a Supreme Court of Justice composed of five to seven members who would serve for three-year terms and also be popularly elected (Articles 132-140). The 1824 Constitution also contained provisions in regard to the responsibility and accountability of public officials (Articles 141-151), civil liberties (Articles 152-174), limitations on authority (Articles 175-176), the organization of state governments (Articles 177-191), and the admission of new states (Articles 196-198). An attempt in 1835 to reform the 1824 document failed.

For all practical purposes, the Federal Republic of Central America came to an end in 1838 with the withdrawal of Costa Rica and Nicaragua. There have been any number of reasons advanced as to the cause of the failure of the federation. William F. Slade contended that the rupture represented essentially a political failure due to "the ignorance of self-government, the conflict of political principles [federalists versus centralists], the defects of the constitution and [the] deadly enmity of parties [the]." ⁷⁵ Karnes added additional causes which contributed to the federation's demise. ⁷⁶ One of these factors was the absence of a stabilizing effect which a large business class offers. There was also the religious controversy which by itself was "almost sufficient to destroy the federation." ⁷⁷ In regard to the constitutional defects, upon which Karnes contends too much emphasis has been placed, the Constitution provided for a poorly balanced division

⁷⁵ "The Federation of Central America," Journal of Race Development, VIII (July, 1917), p. 96.

⁷⁶ Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 90.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

of powers among the branches of government (especially where the chief executive was concerned), created a problem of equitable representation due to Guatemala's disproportionate population in relation to the other states, and failed to specify the location of the federal district. Other factors involved in the breakup was the lack of external dangers or pressures which are important to political solidarity.⁷⁸ "Certainly the scarcity of funds had a crippling effect and contributed demonstrably to the lack of respect for the central government."⁷⁹ Then there also existed the quarrels between factions within the states, quarrels between the states, and the problem of the dominant position of Guatemala within the federation.

Almost immediately following the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Central America, there were efforts to re-create the federation and such efforts have continued ever since. During roughly the next two decades at least eight attempts were made at reestablishing the federation. Two such attempts were made in 1842. The first one began with the conference in Nicaragua at Chinandega with delegates from El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. These delegates signed the Pacto de Chinandega. However, nothing ever came of the pact except that it did lay the foundation for the organization of the Central American Confederation later in 1842. The second 1842 pact was ratified by only three states--El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua.⁸⁰ The executive power was vested in a council composed of one delegate chosen by the legislative

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 55.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 61.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 128.

body of each state, with one delegate being selected as the supreme delegate, or president, for a one-year term. The legislative power was vested "in a loose gathering of representatives who acted more in the capacity of emissaries than legislators."⁸¹ Each state retained its autonomy and sovereignty. The Central American Federation continued in existence--more on paper than in reality--until 1845 when the supreme delegate announced at the end of his term that his position no longer existed.

Following the demise of this Central American Federation, other attempts at federation were tried, including the attempt of William Walker to establish himself at the head of a united Central America. Speaking of the various attempts at federation during this period, Karnes stated: "The re-establishment of their ideal was often confused with military alliances for defense, while opportunism and expediency reigned."⁸²

The next important move for Central American unification came during the years of Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala.⁸³ Barrios invited all the Central American republics to attend a conference in 1876. The conference was held in Guatemala City and the central theme was the reconstruction of a federal union. In his invitation, Barrios included an agenda of fourteen items to be considered. The major goal was the achieving of "a pacific means of managing international affairs--a single

⁸¹
Ibid.

⁸²
Ibid., p. 136.

⁸³
Ibid., pp. 153-162. See also Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Central America, Vol. III. 1801-1887, (San Francisco: History Company, Publishers, 1887), pp. 431-452.

state organized for purposes of common defense and foreign policy."⁸⁴

Barrios envisioned a gradual evolution into a federation, with the first step consisting of combining the diplomatic services of the Central American nations. Other steps to be taken would include the merging of the merchant marines, road systems, communications systems, laws, education and citizenship. All five republics were represented at the conference. "After brief discussions the delegates went to their homes to think over the terms."⁸⁵ However, the relations among the Central American republics were critical and wars among the states ensued.

Once again in 1882 Barrios made another move toward the creation of a federation. In a circular addressed to the Liberals of the isthmus, Barrios said that the time was appropriate for planning a federal union, especially since Guatemala no longer demanded so much of his time. According to Barrios, he and the El Salvadorean president already had a working agreement and were preparing detailed plans for a convention. Barrios maintained that he would not accept the presidency of a unified Central America and would not use force to create a federal union. However, the conference never occurred and Barrios proceeded by the use of force to create a federation, but this attempt ended in failure when he was killed in battle on April 2, 1885 at Chalchuapa.

On January 20, 1887 another conference was held in Guatemala City with the agenda once again centering on the unification of the isthmus.⁸⁶ All five states were represented at the conference. Included

⁸⁴ Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 153.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 164-167.

in the pact signed by all the states were several articles specifically concerned with Central American unity and harmony. They agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other. All citizens regardless of the republics in which they resided would possess the same rights. They agreed upon reciprocal free trade among themselves commencing September 15, 1890, and that another conference designed to unify the legal codes of the five states would be held in two months. The five signatories also decided that a conference would be held in 1890 in San Salvador to specifically prepare for the union of the five. The pact signed by the representatives of the five Central American nations was ratified by Costa Rica, El Salvador (with reservations), Guatemala and Honduras, but not by Nicaragua.

The proposed 1890 conference met in San Salvador on October 15, 1889 and completed its work in Managua on November 7. The project of the conference provided for the recreation of the Republic of Central America. The states retained their autonomy in the area of internal affairs. The states would be united under a supreme executive in regard to foreign relations. He would be one of the presidents of the five Central American countries, selected by the drawing of lots and would serve only for one year. All acts of the supreme executive had to be approved by an advisory group composed of five men, one being named by each president for a one-year term. The supreme executive was to serve as a mediator among the five states and was prohibited from using force. The capital would rotate according to which country's president was the supreme executive. The pact drawn up by the 1889 conference was designed to accomplish the complete integration of the five states over a period of time, commencing September 15, 1890.

According to Karnes, "The greatest wisdom in this document was that it, more than any of its predecessors, recognized the necessity for the gradual application of the principles that the framers all professed to believe in."⁸⁷ Unfortunately, no permanent results were achieved by the pact as it was never ratified by all the states due to disturbances, especially the mysterious death of the popular President Francisco Menéndez of El Salvador and his replacement by a military dictatorship.

On June 20, 1895, the Pact of Amapala was signed by the presidents of El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua and was ratified by each government respectively.⁸⁸ The Pact of Amapala created the Greater Republic of Central America and once again was designed as an evolutionary process which would ultimately result in the complete integration of the isthmus. The states once again retained their independence and autonomy in regard to internal affairs and their constitutions would remain in effect as long as they were not in direct conflict with the terms of the pact. The government created by the pact was primarily concerned with foreign relations and consisted of a diet composed of one member and one alternate named by the legislative body of each signatory nation. The capital of the government would rotate among the state capitals based on the drawing of lots. Guatemala and Costa Rica were urged to adhere to the pact, but never did. The Greater Republic of Central America achieved its diplomatic unity and its three member states were represented by one diplomatic corps.

Under the terms of the Pact of Amapala, a general assembly was

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 166.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 168-174.

to be called within three years to establish a complete and permanent union. The constituent assembly met in June, 1898 in Managua and was composed of twenty delegates from each member state, selected by their respective legislatures. The result was the creation of the United States of Central America. The constituent assembly prepared a constitution for the new union.⁸⁹ The Constitution provided for a bicameral federal congress with the membership of the Chamber of Deputies being based on population and the membership of the federal Senate being based on the equality of states. Deputies were to be popularly elected while senators were to be selected by the respective state legislatures. The powers of both houses were spelled out and the overall effect closely resembled that found in the case of the United States Congress. The constitution provided for a popularly-elected president and also for an elected Supreme Court of Federal Justice composed of five members. The constitution went into effect on November 1, 1898. However, on November 13, General Tomás Regalado seized power in El Salvador and withdrew that country from the union. An attempt on the part of the United States of Central America to suppress the revolt failed and on November 30 the federation was dissolved.

Additional attempts at unifying the isthmus also proved fruitless during the next two decades, and another attempt was made in 1920-1921.⁹⁰ Representatives from all five Central American republics met in San José, Costa Rica, on December 4, 1920. However, Nicaragua soon withdrew from the conference in a dispute concerning the recognition of the terms of

⁸⁹ Gallardo, Cuatro Constituciones Federales, pp. 41-59.

⁹⁰ Karnes, The Failure of Union, pp. 211-222.

the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. The Pact of San José provided for the creation of a Provisional Federal Council composed of a delegate from each participating state. The principal function of the Provisional Federal Council was to convoke a constituent assembly which would write a constitution for the Federation of Central America. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras ratified the Pact of San José, which met the minimum requirement for the convoking of the constituent assembly. The constituent assembly met July 20, 1921, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. On September 9 the constitution of the Federation of Central America was promulgated. Once again, each participating state would retain its independence and autonomy in internal affairs.⁹¹ A bicameral congress was established. The Senate would be composed of three senators chosen by each state legislature and one from the federal district (Tegucigalpa was proclaimed the capital). The House of Deputies was to be popularly-elected and its membership was based on population. The Congress was designed along the lines of that of the United States. The constitution provided for a plural executive--the Federal Council. It was to be composed of one member from each signatory state and its members would elect a president and vice president from among themselves each year. The Supreme Court of Justice was to be composed of seven members, who would be elected by the federal Senate. Each state would nominate seven candidates for the Court and from all the nominees the Senate would select seven. The constitution also contained provisions on fiscal affairs (Articles 137-148), the armed forces (Articles 149-162), labor and social cooperation (Articles 163-172), responsibility of

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Gallardo, Cuatro Constituciones Federales, pp. 60-102.

public officials (Articles 173-176), coat of arms and flag (Articles 180-186), the admission of Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Articles 190-192), and laws and civil liberties (Articles 32-66). Attached to the constitutional document were three laws which concerned the press, amparo, and the state of seige and would become effective upon ratification of the proposed constitution.

As had occurred so many times in the past, the new federation never really got off the ground. Before it was firmly organized, a coup occurred in Guatemala and the successful junta (Generals José María Orellana, Jorge Ubico and José María Larrave) replaced Guatemala's representatives to the federation government in Tegucigalpa. The Federal Council refused to recognize the new delegates named by the junta, and the federation shortly thereafter disintegrated. By February 7, 1922 it no longer existed.

In comparing the pact written by the Guatemalan-Salvadorean commission in 1947 with the previous attempts at federation one finds that the 1947 document represented no radical departure from the past. In fact, the 1947 document appears to be a hodgepodge of warmed-over remnants of the past. The 1947 pact, as was the case with all of the earlier attempts, guaranteed each state independence and autonomy in its internal affairs. It also provided that state constitutions remained in effect unless in conflict with the provisions of the pact. The 1947 pact provided for a unicameral legislative body during the life of the pact with the members being selected by the respective state legislatures. As in the case of the 1842 Central American Confederation and the pact of 1921, the executive power was vested in a plural executive. The 1947 pact also provided for a supreme court but specifically took pains

to guarantee that it was a truly Central American court by ensuring that the membership of the court would consist of jurists from each of the five republics, whether or not their governments adhered to the pact. The precedent for this proposed court upon which the mixed commission drew was the Central American Court of Justice which had existed from 1907 to 1917.⁹² The two courts had in common such features as the prohibition against the jurists exercising a profession or holding a public office, the declaration that the court was "the national conscience of Central America," and the courts' jurisdiction. Like most of the earlier proposals, the 1947 pact was drawn up by only part of the Central American states--two in this case. The 1947 document also possessed in common with the earlier attempts of Barrios and those of 1887, 1889, 1895 and 1921, the provision that the proposed federation would be achieved over a given period of time. This evolutionary approach to Central American unity has tended to dominate the efforts made since 1876. The 1947 pact, like its predecessors of 1842 and 1889, was not ratified and thereby was prevented from going into effect. Likewise, the most common characteristic of all the attempts, including the 1947 pact, was the fact that they failed. Consequently, as far as the writing of the 1947 document is concerned, it would appear that the framers were well acquainted with the history of the Central American unionist movement and made no major deviation from past attempts.

The framers proved to be poor students of history in that they failed to develop any new pattern of cohesion. They seemed not to have

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Manly O. Hudson, "The Central American Court of Justice," American Journal of International Law, XXVI (October, 1922), pp. 759-786.

understood the reasons for the past failures and thus were unable to work out new approaches to prevent their own failure. The causes for the earlier failures had been examined by writers prior to the writing of the 1947 pact. As early as 1917, William F. Slade, in an extensive article, outlined the various attempts at unification and discussed the reasons for the failures.⁹³ According to Slade, there were forces working against the unity of Central America even prior to its independence in 1821.⁹⁴ He listed these divisive forces as including the conflicts of the conquerors, the tribal grouping of the natives, the historical traditions of the Spaniards such as their individualism and allegiance to a small locality, the maladministration of the colonies by Spain which hindered self-government, and the inexperience of the colonists in governmental affairs.

Some of the pre-independence divisive forces continued in existence following Central America's independence. There were also adverse effects due to the other divisive forces such as the inexperience in colonial self-government. Post-independence divisive forces, according to Slade, included the jealousy of the states toward each other, the revolutionary habit of Central America, the corruption of political life, the mixed characteristic of its population as well as its sparseness, and the policies of the British, the United States and Mexico.⁹⁵ Another author views the obstacles favoring disunity as being primarily three: the failure of representative government in Central America--the basic

⁹³"The Federation of Central America," Journal of Race Development, VIII (July, 1917), pp. 79-150 and VIII (October, 1917), pp. 204-275.

⁹⁴Ibid., pp. 79-81.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 241-259.

factor-- , nationalism and the isolation of Costa Rica from the rest of the isthmus.⁹⁶ Also important as a disrupting influence has been the exaggerated localism found within the republics of Central America. Another divisive factor should also be recognized:

The jealousies among the military, despotic presidents of the different Central American countries, the desire of each of these leaders to become himself the president of the Federation, the stubborn selfishness of each in not being willing to yield his power as president except to assume a greater similar power; these have been the reason why the Union has not been made a fact.⁹⁷

The question comes to mind whether or not Central American unity is an "impossible dream"? Karnes is one author who seems to take the view that Central American unification is unobtainable:

Is it possible that Central Americans have grossly exaggerated the grass-roots strength of the confederation feeling? There are no mass movements, no popular demonstrations, no confederationist candidates. The historic Central American goal has been reduced to a literary exercise.⁹⁸

Alberto Herrarte, however, feels that a different approach is necessary. Herrarte, who served as one of the Guaemalan delegates on the commission which wrote the 1947 pact, has come to believe that: "La división de Centro América en los cinco Estados tampoco obedeció a ninguna razón de orden histórico, geográfico ni racial."⁹⁹ What is necessary is

Una nueva división que consultara los verdaderos intereses regionales, consolidaría más la nueva República, tanto porque las regiones responderían a un orden natural, como porque las

⁹⁶ Karnes, The Failure of Union, pp. 244-248.

⁹⁷ Salomón de la Selva, "On the Proposed Union of Central America," Hispanic American Historical Review, III (November, 1920), p. 567.

⁹⁸ Karnes, The Failure of Union, p. 254.

⁹⁹ Herrarte, La Unión de Centro América, p. 358.

fuerzas del separatismo quedarían definitivamente liquidadas, al desaparecer en su actual entidad los cinco Estados.¹⁰⁰

However, in view of the existing adverse obstacles, not the least being the spirit of nationalism, it is highly doubtful that such an approach as recommended by Herrarte will ever be given a trial.¹⁰¹

Conclusion

With his election as president of Guatemala, Arévalo was finally in a position to attempt to implement his fervent desire for the unification of Central America. While he had remained silent in regard to the unification theme during the presidential campaign and the months following the election, Arévalo again reiterated his sincere interest in Central American unity in his inaugural address on March 15, 1945. However, the portion of the inaugural address regarding Central America was no more than a repetition of his intellectually-oriented essays of 1935 and 1939.

It was only with the conference at San Cristóbal de la Frontera that Arévalo began an earnest attempt to achieve a Central American federation. He carried with him to the conference his idea of "progressive federation," an idea which he had been considering for a number of years and the only approach which he felt had a chance of success.

This effort was continued at the Santa Ana Conference, but seems to have

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 359.

¹⁰¹ The most recent attempts made at bringing unity to the isthmus have been variations on earlier themes. The Organization of Central American States (ODECA) is basically a confederation attempt at unity, modeled on the Organization of American States. The Central American Common Market was the most extensive effort to date to bring about the economic integration of the isthmus.

diminished thereafter. There are several items which appeared first at the conference of San Cristóbal de la Frontera and recurred at the Santa Ana conference. First, neither conference was arranged at the complete initiative of Arévalo. The San Cristóbal de la Frontera conference was arranged through the cooperation of the Central American Patriotic Union and two of its affiliates, one in El Salvador and one in Guatemala. The Santa Ana conference was arranged under the auspices of Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero. These conferences were the result of consultations by Arévalo with unionist party leaders. This consultation was what had constituted his first act as president to promote Central American unification, action which he hinted at in the interview with Luis C. Manjarrez of Excelsior and made more explicit in the private interview granted to this student. Second, in the case of each conference, the only participants were President Arévalo of Guatemala and President Castaneda Castro of El Salvador. Thus, the conferences certainly could not be said to be representative of Central America and it could not be confidently expected that a Central American federation consisting of the five republics would be the end result. However, these circumstances did fit in with Arévalo's idea of "progressive federation." Third, each conference was a one-day affair. Fourth, the basic plan which evolved out of each conference was that of a progressive federation which would gradually emerge through the combining of individual sectors of the states. And, lastly, both conferences were held at locations other than the capital cities, with the first being held at San Cristóbal de la Frontera, Guatemala and the second at Santa Ana, El Salvador.

The major decision reached at the San Cristóbal de la Frontera conference was the decision to appoint joint technical commissions for

the study of specific areas. The reasoning involved in this decision was that each study would be detailed and would present a proposed plan for the actual merging of that specific activity between the two nations. There was no real concern about erecting a federal structure, although certain federal structures, such as a Federal Senate and President, were mentioned. The emphasis was on merging the various sectors of the states and the federal structure would follow thereafter.

The two presidents at San Cristóbal de la Frontera also agreed that the pact should be open so as to enable others to join it. However, Arévalo in his address to the people after the conference placed a considerable restriction on this part of the agreement. He stated that the federation would consist only of Guatemala and El Salvador so that the difficulties could be simplified and the proper foundations strengthened. It would be only after the federation between Guatemala and El Salvador had obtained practical and definitive results that others would be permitted to join. Arévalo neglected to define what he meant by "practical and definitive results," who would determine when these had been achieved, and some type of chronological guideline as to when such results might be anticipated. The statement seems to constitute a slight to the other three republics, a slight which now appears not to have been intentional. However, the net result was to tell the other republics that Guatemala and El Salvador did not desire their company at the present and that they would be notified when they could apply for membership in the exclusive club. But in all fairness to Arévalo, this statement was within the confines of his proposal of a "progressive federation" although his position does not seem to have been made explicit and left considerable room for misinterpretation.

The proposed study commissions, for the most part, were organized and carried out their instructions. However, the two presidents did not meet again to consider the reports and decide on the next steps. It remained for Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero to bring about the next step in the form of the Santa Ana conference. The major result of the Santa Ana conference was the creation of a mixed commission to formulate an overall plan for federation. Presumably the mixed commission, which was never anything more than a joint commission, had at its disposal the reports of the earlier study commissions which had carried out their instructions. The pact of Santa Ana, which imposed no real obligations on anyone, was ratified by both the Guatemalan and the Salvadorean Congress in the fall of 1946.

The pact which the commission agreed upon in April, 1947, was based on past experience and combined the general agreements reached at both San Cristóbal de la Frontera and Santa Ana. The commission did not accept Arévalo's proposal of "progressive federation" in that it left the membership in the federation open so as to permit the non-participating states to join at their pleasure. The commission decided that the evolutionary movement toward unification needed more central direction than that devised at San Cristóbal de la Frontera. To aid in carrying out the proposed plan, the pact provided for the creation of federal governmental structures: the National Diet, the Executive Delegation and the Central American Court of Justice. What the commission did in effect was to create a confederation which was designed to evolve into a federation over a five-year period. At the end of the transition period, a National Constituent Assembly would be elected and it would prepare and approve a constitution for a Central American federation.

The commission's project would have permitted other Central American states to join at any time and did not limit the proposed union to only Guatemala and El Salvador nor require that other states wait until definitive results had been achieved.

The projected pact produced by the Guatemalan-Salvadorean commission was certainly a moderate approach to the effort to unify Central America. It was within the general confines of the ideas which had been set forth by Arévalo at San Cristóbal de la Frontera and reiterated by him at Santa Ana although it did not adhere to this theory of "progressive federation." The question then arises as to why the pact was never acted upon. Not a single Central American republic ever ratified the pact. Arévalo maintains that the Pact of 1947 did not require official ratification by any legislative body as it was a project and not a law or treaty.¹⁰² However, this view is in direct conflict with Article XL of the Pact which required the constitutional ratification by the Legislative Assembly of each state. A more logical explanation is that the internal political problems in each of the Central American republics prevented any further concrete action.

It would seem that by at least early 1947, Arévalo had gained sufficient political experience to cause his disillusionment as to the potential success of the Central American unification movement. The intellectual had been forced to confront reality. From the time immediately following the conference at Santa Ana on September 12, 1946, and continuing until he surrendered the presidency to Jacobo Arbenz Guzman on

¹⁰²Arévalo, private interview. It may be that in the time lapse from 1947 to 1971, Arévalo has forgotten the details of the Pact.

March 15, 1951, Arévalo forsook the unification effort, action-wise that is. This view is supported by the fact that his government did not obtain ratification of the Pact of 1947 by the Guatemalan Congress. It was also in early 1947 that the question of Belice flared up and provided an issue on which Arévalo could call for support of his government, thereby replacing the issue of Central American unity as a rallying cry. Further evidence can be adduced from his position in regard to the conference proposed by President Castaneda Castro in December, 1948.

When the idea of a conference of the presidents of the five Central American republics surfaced in late 1948, Arévalo did little to encourage such a meeting. He did order the 1947 pact to be published. He then admonished the Central American presidents that if they were sincerely interested in Central American unification, then they should obtain the ratification of the Pact of 1947 by their respective congresses. This admonition is somewhat ironical when it is recalled that Guatemala had yet to ratify the pact. In addition, when a date for the conference was finally confirmed, Arévalo was absent from Guatemala City and was not scheduled to return in time to attend the conference. The ouster of Castaneda Castro made the conference a moot proposition, but the fact remained that Arévalo had managed to display his disillusionment with the unification effort and an unencouraging attitude toward the ill-fated conference. Arévalo had reached the more realistic position that under existing conditions in the various Central American republics, Central American federation was not currently possible. Consequently, Arévalo decided to devote his fulltime attention to Guatemalan affairs and put Central American unity on a backshelf.

CHAPTER IV

POST-PRESIDENTIAL THOUGHT

On March 15, 1951, Arévalo surrendered the presidency to his constitutionally elected successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. From 1951 until 1954, Arévalo served Guatemala as a diplomatic representative, but his diplomatic credentials were canceled in 1954 by the junta which assumed power after the downfall of Arbenz. From 1954 until 1970 Arévalo was virtually a man without a country as he was barred from returning to Guatemala. In 1971 the Guatemalan government permitted his return to Guatemala and named him ambassador to Venezuela.

Since leaving the presidency, Arévalo has continued to write on political affairs. The only post-presidential work which deals directly with Central American unity is the essay "Five Flags: One Destiny."¹ There are three books which have been written by Arévalo since his departure from the presidential office. While these works do not deal directly with Central America as an entity, implications and traces of Arévalo's thinking on the matter are to be found in them. The three works are Guatemala: La Democracia y el Imperio,² Fábula del

¹ United Nations World, V (September, 1951), 33-35.

² (Buenos Aires: Editorial Renacimiento, 1955). Several editions of the work appeared in 1954 in Santiago, Montevideo and Mexico City. The 1955 edition has an added epilogue.

Tiburón y las Sardinias,³ and AntiKommunismo en América Latina.⁴

"Five Flags: One Destiny"

The essay represents a return to the 1930's, a reiteration of the intellectual exercise of the mind found in Arévalo's essays of 1935 and 1939. The essay begins with the creation of the United Provinces of Central America in 1821, with its capital at Guatemala City. Its leaders were faced with two dilemmas: the difficulty of providing unity of life and purpose to a territory of half a million square kilometers and the conflict of ideologies engendered by the echoes of the distant French Revolution and the fall of the colonial government.

Within the federation there arose two groups--Conservatives and Liberals. The Conservatives sought to retain the social structure of the colonial period while the Liberals represented the revolutionary movement accenting popular education and judicial reform. The end result was the disintegration of the federation due to regional jealousies, internal wars and inferior caudillos. The overall effect on the five small republics was that they were

Confined in narrow areas, their economic potentials were reduced to a minimum and their political structure deteriorated. The Executive power was strengthened at the cost of other branches of the government and political functions were confused with military ones. Their civic, cultural and economic life came to a standstill.⁵

³ (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Meridión, 1956). An English translation was published by Lyle Stuart (New York) in 1961 under the title of The Shark and the Sardines.

⁴ (Buenos Aires: Editorial Palestra, 1959). An English translation was published in 1963 by Lyle Stuart (New York) under the title of Anti-Kommunism in Latin America, with an introduction by Carleton Beals. It will be the English edition to which future references will be made.

⁵ Arévalo, "Five Flags." p. 34.

The brief lifespan of the federation had been insufficient to permit the region to "organize its judicial and economic life or to raise the deplorable cultural standards" due to the frequent and savage internal wars.⁶ Even with the disintegration of the federation, the wars continued and revolution became the preferred occupation. As a consequence, neither public wealth nor official attention could be focused on education and the development of commerce, industry and the arts. The only noticeable benefit which resulted from the rupture of the federation was the disappearance of the disparity between Guatemala and the rest of the isthmus.

The major misfortune which has befallen Central America as a result of the federation's demise has been in the cultural area.

By culture I mean the spontaneous and uniform flourishing of popular emotions on the march which by their genetic force produce artistic forms in clear collective tones and of an evident national character. Culture is that militant social force which serves as the basis and background for individual contribution and whose purpose is a constant raising of the peoples' standard of living.⁷

While Central America has produced outstanding men in many fields of endeavor, the region has not grown culturally and there remains a "thirst for culture" on the isthmus.

The essay then proceeds to talk of monostructural and polystructural societies. In a monostructural nation, all life revolves around the public administration, or an all-powerful executive. The monostructural stage is "an initial state, undoubtedly inferior in its singleness, its lack of vitality, its lack of projection into its surroundings."⁸

⁶
Ibid.

⁷
Ibid., p. 35.

⁸
Ibid.

In the case of the polystructural society, on the other hand: "Geographical and historical circumstances have allowed these countries to acquire the physiological complexity and plural autonomy of component parts which characterizes them."⁹ The nations of Central America have not progressed past the monostructural stage, the stage of their colonial inheritance.

If the Central American nations are to bring an end to their monostructural state, they must unite. "Once the isthmus has again become a great nation, the omnipotence of the Executive Power will have been cancelled out and the people will once more be in a condition to carry forward their cultural destiny."¹⁰ The political federation must occur before a spiritual rebirth can take place. The spiritual qualities which are indispensable to such a spiritual rebirth are present in the region, they only await the formation of a new federation.

As in the case of the essays of 1935 and 1939, no guidelines were offered as to how the political federation of the isthmus could be brought about. However, the essay probably should not be included as one of Arévalo's post-presidential writings as he did not actually write it himself.¹¹ The article was prepared by someone on the staff of the United Nations World who merely presented a brief summary translation of Arévalo's earlier essays.¹²

⁹
Ibid.

¹⁰
Ibid.

¹¹
Arévalo, private interview.

¹²
Arévalo does not know the identity of the person responsible for the article attributed to his authorship. Ibid.

The Polemical Trilogy

Commencing with the essays of 1935 and 1939 and continuing to 1951, Arévalo had focused his attention primarily on the forces and problems of unification within the region of Central America. However, in 1954 he shifted his attention more to the international level and especially to the United States. In roughly half a decade, Arévalo produced three books attacking the United States Department of State. While the three works do not deal directly with the topic of Central American unification, there are implications which can be gleaned from them.

The first book of the trilogy was Guatemala: La Democracia y el Imperio and it laid the foundation for the other two works. The book was written in seven days in June, 1954, and was designed as an instrument of defense for Guatemala at the then-planned meeting of foreign ministers (OAS) scheduled for July 7 in Río de Janeiro.¹³ The book was completed the day that Arbenz resigned the Guatemalan presidency, June 27, and the work then became an act of public protest. In February, 1955, an epilogue was added to the original work.

The second part of the trilogy was the Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas, published in 1956. This work once again attacked the United States government. However, the scope of the attack was hemispheric whereas the attack in Guatemala had been primarily limited to Guatemalan-United States relations. This work has probably received more attention in the United States than any of Arévalo's other writings.

The final book of the trilogy was entitled AntiKommunismo en

¹³ Arévalo, Guatemala, p. 10.

América Latina. It continued the exposition of foreign influence and exploitation found in Latin America on the part of the United States. Arévalo further elaborated on a conceptual framework which he had first used in the Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas. He distinguished between communism spelled with a "c" and that spelled with a "k." Communism ("c") referred to the Soviet variety. Kommunism ("k") referred to the labeling of social reform programs as "red" by the United States Department of State and North American business corporations, especially those connected with Wall Street such as the United Fruit Company.

One theme which appears continually in the trilogy is that of the smallness and weakness of the Latin American nations in comparison with the powerful United States. Arévalo states over and over that the nations, such as Guatemala, are defenseless against the world's most powerful nation. In contrasting the relationship between Nicaragua and the United States, Arévalo noted that "no podía presentarse desnivel de fuerzas más grotesco."¹⁴ The nations of Latin America, and especially those of Central America, are economically and militarily weak and individually are no match for "la Nación más poderosa del mundo."¹⁵

In the essays of 1935 and 1939, Arévalo listed one of the causes of disunity as the inferior caudillos. It would appear that now he views the United States, specifically the Department of State and Wall Street,

¹⁴ Arévalo, Fábula del Tiburón, p. 70. Recently Arévalo stated that "en el libro FABULA DEL TIBURON Y LAS SARDINAS, todo el capítulo segundo está dedicado a la defensa de la soberanía nicaragüense, como parte de Centro América, --soberanía puesta en duda por el Tratado Bryan-Chamorro. Arévalo habla del tema como si fuera nicaragüense." Arévalo, unpublished typed statement, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ Arévalo, Guatemala, p. 13.

as an inferior caudillo responsible for maintaining the state of disunity in Latin America in general and Central America specifically. Arévalo notes that "Cada país latinoamericano tiene su problema propio, y los Estados Unidos lo saben."¹⁶ With the United States aware of the problems of each country, it can proceed to deal individually with each nation, manipulating the nation so that the goals of the United States (Wall Street) are achieved. The United States uses bilateral treaties and international law as the means to accomplish its objectives. The moral of the fable of the shark and the sardine is that a bilateral treaty (such as the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1914-1916) merely serves to legalize the existing condition of exploitation and imperialism.¹⁷ Likewise, Arévalo condemned international law as a tool of the Empire (the United States):

. . . denunciamos una vez más la función celestina del Derecho Internacional, puesto desvergonzadamente al servicio del Imperio, para disimular sus trapacerías, para cohonestar la rapiña de sus banqueros, para cubrir veladamente la carnicería de sus marinos y sus aviadores.¹⁸

In order to achieve the objectives determined for it by Wall Street, the United States has to

. . . mantenerse cada República como isla separada de sus hermanas, sin posibilidad de mutua ayuda, vinculada y comprometida exclusivamente al Imperio. América Latina: el archipiélago. Estados Unidos: la cumbre de la pirámide para comunicarse.¹⁹

Another noteworthy characteristic of Central America previously discussed by Arévalo was the monostructural form of its society. In his

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁷ Arévalo, Fábula del Tiburón, pp. 11-31.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

earlier essays, Arévalo felt that the answer to this problem was a political federation. In the last work of the trilogy, Arévalo speaks of "the powerful minority of those who rule" and "the non-participating majority of those ruled."²⁰ The "powerful minority of those who rule" would have to be considered the home-grown variety of inferior caudillos to whom Arévalo applies the label of "police rulers." The police ruler does not govern, but administers. According to Arévalo, "the Police Rulers together with their national oligarchies have come to be the guardians of the interests of the Empire, i.e., of the interests of a minority who govern the Occident from New York."²¹ An example of a police ruler would certainly be President Juan Manuel Gálvez of Honduras, who aided in the downfall of Arbenz.²² The police rulers follow Washington's (Wall Street's) orders and are assisted by lower functionaries, especially the local police. Pointing to the evident continuation of the monostructural state, Arévalo noted the duties of these governmental functionaries in maintaining the status quo: "Their duties were to hunt down criminals--those who really were, those who were said to be, and those whom it was convenient to consider so."²³

Throughout the polemical trilogy the general theme of the need for unity and strength which would be derived thereof is pervasive. Viewing Latin America as a whole, Arévalo feels that if the nations would join together they could help each other to regain their national

²⁰ Arévalo, Anti-Kommunism, p. 23.

²¹ Ibid., p. 27.

²² Arévalo, Guatemala, pp. 23-24.

²³ Arévalo, Anti-Kommunism, p. 18.

sovereignty. By implication, it would seem that the drawing together or federation of the Central American republics would also be a formidable step in reclaiming the sovereignty for the isthmus.²⁴ The reclamation of sovereignty would permit the countries, such as Guatemala, to buy arms wherever they could obtain the best deal and not be restricted to the United States.²⁵ The countries would be able also to pass legislation such as progressive labor codes and agrarian reform programs without foreign intervention, either by a government or business interests.²⁶

Arévalo takes cognizance of past attempts--failures and successes--by Latin American nations to band together to exert their sovereign rights. One noted failure was that of Simón Bolívar in 1826. According to Arévalo:

. . . las sardinas latinoamericanas, capitaneadas entonces por el genio de Bolívar, no se sintieron cómodas con la doctrina de Monroe. Bolívar mismo le vió los doscientos dientes al tiburón. Y sin mayor demora, en diciembre de 1824, Bolívar respondió a Monroe

²⁴ "Había algo más: aquella entrevista [Santa Ana, 1946] tenía otra "imagen". Lo esencial era que Arévalo pretendía formar un bloque de resistencia al Imperialismo yankee. Y naturalmente, los demás gobernantes no quisieron exponerse a una represalia indirecta de Roma y si el punto de reunión no hubiese sido Santa Ana en El Salvador, seguramente ni Castaneda Castro habría asistido. Por eso, pues, sufrimos la cachetada que nos dieron al negarse a asistir a tales pláticas. Yo recuerdo que me había opuesto a tal reunión, pero el presidente Arévalo no escuchaba ni a sus amigos ni a sus funcionarios. Tenía sobre todos demasiada personalidad y por eso el lo resolvía todo y creía que todos en Centroamérica escucharían su voz como se la escuchaba adentro". Clemente Marroquín Rojas, "No hubo entrevista entre los dos gobernantes," La Hora, (3 de junio de 1971), p. 6. Arévalo said that this was totally false. His problems with the United States did not begin until 1948 when the United States sent a merchant (Richard C. Patterson, Jr.) to Guatemala instead of an ambassador. Arévalo, private interview.

²⁵ Arévalo, Guatemala, p. 29.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 29-30.

convocando desde Lima a un Congreso de naciones hispano-americanas, y prescinde de Estados Unidos y del Brazil. Era toda una respuesta. Era la visión del líder continental que se proponía organizar la familia para su propia salud. Un sindicato de sardinas enfrentándose al cachorro de tiburón. Y convengamos en que entonces las sardinas no lo eran tanto, y bien pudieron prepararse contra las terribles desgracias que sobrevendrían. Pero no: el Congreso de Panamá (1826) fué un fracaso.²⁷

However, the nations have been more successful at other times. One such success was in 1856 when the Central American sardines joined forces and removed William Walker from the Central American scene.²⁸ A more recent success, although one that did not last for long, was at the Bogotá conference in 1948: "¿No fué allí donde se obtuvo otro voto condenando los gobiernos de facto y los totalitarios, a pesar de las simpatías con que Estados Unidos miran a tales gobiernos?"²⁹

There is found also in the polemical trilogy the same emphasis upon the role of the youth in reclaiming Central America as in the essays of 1935 and 1939. In discussing events in Nicaragua during the early years of the twentieth century (roughly 1908-1916), Arévalo asks what did the other sardines do while Nicaragua was having difficulties with the United States? What did the governments do? What did the political parties do? Then he notes:

¡Ah, sí: los estudiantets [sic] universitarios. . . ! Claro: siempre los adolescentes. Parecería que la dignidad, la vergüenza, el decoro, la moral cívica, fueran propiedad exclusiva de esa edad florida--¡y fugaz! --que se llama la adolescencia. Porque más allá de la adolescencia, el adulto latinoamericano deviene otro hombre negación impúdica de su propio pasado juvenil.³⁰

²⁷ Arévalo, Fábula del Tiburón, p. 81.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 93.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

Arévalo also takes cognizance of the role of youth when he concludes the chapter "The United States and Its Anti-Kommunism" thusly: "But greater still will be these tasks for the Young of tomorrow when they will have to recover that which we, in this mid-century, did not know how to retain."³¹

Current Thought on Central American Unity³²

EL UNIONISMO en América Central es un sentimiento muy extendido, principalmente en las jóvenes generaciones y entre los círculos de intelectuales. No es un sentimiento unánime, pero sí es notablemente mayoritario. Son pocas las personas o las agrupaciones que rechazan la idea de volver a la Federación política. Generalmente se trata de personas que tienen intereses concretos que resultarían lastimados al producirse una Federación política. Entre estos grupos o personas individuales podemos mencionar, como ejemplo, a los precandidatos presidenciales en cada una de las actuales Repúblicas: ellos entienden que al llegar a la Federación perderían sus posibilidades de ascenso político. Quizá también podrían mencionarse comerciantes, empresarios, productores que ya tienen contratos favorables obtenidos de los actuales Gobiernos. Pero la generalidad de los habitantes de Centro América consideran como una necesidad real, una conveniencia pública, reconstruir la República Federal.³³

With this written background statement, Dr. Arévalo commenced the private interview in Caracas on June 11, 1971. He explicitly stated that his interest in Central American unity was still as sincere today as it was before and during his presidency. "Con posterioridad a su ejercicio presidencial (que terminó en 1951), Arévalo ha mantenido su postura unionista, no solo en la vida privada (conversaciones de índole política) sino en sus escritos."³⁴ As an example of his writings regarding the

³¹ Arévalo, Anti-Kommunism, p. 104.

³² Arévalo, private interview.

³³ Arévalo, unpublished typed statement, p. 1.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

subject, he cited his defense of Nicaragua--as a part of Central America--in regard to the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty in his Fábula del Tiburón y las Sardinas.

Arévalo continues to feel that the unification of Central America is a necessity for the progress of the isthmus. As an example of the benefit of such a federation, Arévalo feels that the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969 would not have occurred if the isthmus had been united. A Federal Republic of Central America would permit the free movement of its citizens and by migration the overpopulation problem of El Salvador and the underpopulated status of Honduras would be changed peacefully and to the benefit of all concerned.

A reunion of the Central American republics is possible and such an idea is completely realistic, according to Arévalo. He still maintains that the only feasible solution to the unification problem is his idea of "progressive federation" which he has expounded upon for several decades. However, he admits that one major change has to be made in the originally conceived plan. The original idea called for the initial federation to begin with Guatemala and El Salvador. However, since the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras, Arévalo now says that the initial federation could not consist of Guatemala and either El Salvador or Honduras because this would make it appear that Guatemala was taking sides in the dispute between those two countries. Consequently, at least for the present and for some time to come, the initial federation would have to begin with two of the three remaining states--Costa Rica, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

On the subject of the capital of the federation, Arévalo believed that in the case of the initial federation between Guatemala and El

Salvador, the capital should be Santa Ana, El Salvador. However, once Honduras was included in the federation, he would prefer to see a new city built in an unsettled area of eastern Honduras, such as was the case with Washington, D.C. and Brasilia.

The Arévalo of today is somewhat more mellow than the Arévalo of the mid- and late-1950's. He places less emphasis upon Central American unification as a political tool to be used against the United States and more stress upon the potential internal benefits for the Central American republics themselves. He concedes that a federation of the isthmus would dilute the voting power of Central America in such organizations as the United Nations and the Organization of American States. However, he retains his sincere faith that Central American unification is both necessary and possible and would provide more benefits than disadvantages to the five nations.

Conclusion

The essay "Five Flags: One Destiny" does not really belong to the post-presidential period. Arévalo, while he is given credit for the article, did not prepare the essay for publication. A nameless individual gleaned the more important aspects from Arévalo's essays of 1935 and 1939 and presented them under Arévalo's byline.

The polemical trilogy offers a difference in emphasis from Arévalo's earlier writings and his presidential attempts at Central American unification. The earlier writings and the presidential action focused on obstacles and problems within the isthmus. The polemical trilogy takes cognizance of another formidable obstacle--that of foreign intervention. Arévalo focuses his attention almost exclusively on the intervention of

the United States, especially intervention on the behalf of United States business interests. This obsession with the role of the United States Department of State in Latin American affairs began with the arrival of Richard C. Patterson, Jr., as United States Ambassador to Guatemala in 1948. However, this concern was particularly reinforced and strengthened by the events leading up to the resignation of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman as president of Guatemala in 1954. Just as the themes of Central American unity and the question of Belice were used as a political carrot during Arévalo's presidency, the "carrot" of the 1950's and 1960's became the question of the intervention of the United States in the affairs of Latin America. It certainly cannot be denied that the thoughts of Arévalo as presented in the trilogy represent the views of a very large segment of the Latin American population. However, while the problem has been succinctly presented, no substantive solution to the problem has been offered.

As of this writing, Arévalo maintains his unfaltering faith in the necessity and the possibility that Central America can be reunited as one nation. He sincerely believes that his concept of "progressive federation" is the only means by which the federation can be reestablished. However, the problem which Arévalo has not tackled is how to initially begin the process that would eventually result in a Federal Republic of Central America. He admitted in the interview that from 1947 to 1951 internal political problems in the Central American republics prevented any action from being taken to bring about a unified isthmus. Yet, the existence of such political problems seem to be the rule rather than the exception in Central America. The problem remains one of how, when and where does one begin?

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Juan José Arévalo, in the decades following 1935, has been more successful as a writer on Central American unification than as a practitioner. His essays of 1935 and 1939 were more an intellectual exercise-of-the-mind than a program for action. In the essays, Arévalo recognized the divisive forces found within Central America. He was fully aware of the split along ideological lines with the Conservatives favoring the maintenance of the status quo and the Liberals advocating a truly revolutionary change. The conservative-liberal split occurred not just among the people of the isthmus generally but internally in each of the states as well. Another divisive force recognized by Arévalo was the selfishness and self-centeredness of ambitious local caudillos. In addition, a narrow concept of nationalism developed within each state, especially as far as its relation to Guatemala was concerned. The revolutionary habit was yet another divisive force presented in Arévalo's writing through his statement that revolution became the preferred occupation of the inhabitants of Central America.

Arévalo also recognized the disadvantages of the disunity of the isthmus. The countries found themselves economically and militarily weakened. The wealth of the isthmus was more easily exploited by foreigners in view of the disunity and the constant civil and isthmanian wars. Arévalo has also contended that certain other unfavorable characteristics have resulted from the rupture of the Federation. These

include the maintenance of the monostructural society on the isthmus, the creation and continued existence of the powerful chief executive, the lack of official culture within each state and the isthmus generally, and the confusion of the political and military functions. Arévalo's solution to all these disadvantages was that the Federation should be reconstructed and then all would be well. Unfortunately, however, he did not make an endeavor to explain in concrete terms how the recreation of the Federation could be accomplished. Arévalo wrote as if the divisive forces which had led to the rupture of the Federation were no longer present, which certainly does not seem to be the case. It is in the area of overcoming the obstacles to unity that Arévalo fell short in the two essays.

With his inauguration as president of Guatemala on March 15, 1945, Arévalo achieved a position of prominence from which he could launch a serious effort to bring about the unification of Central America. Throughout the presidential campaign the issue of Central American unification did not constitute a very important plank in Arévalo's political platform. Arévalo admits that the issue was not important in the campaign but believes that a candidate for the presidency in any of the Central American republics cannot be elected to office if he campaigns on the theme of Central American unification. In his inaugural address, he continued the intellectual views expressed in the essays of 1935 and 1939, especially when he said that all that was necessary to achieve unity was for the five presidents to resign their presidencies and renounce all future presidential ambitions. None of the presidents, including Arévalo, offered to do so.

The two conferences aimed at Central American unification which

were held during this presidency were the result of cooperative efforts between Arévalo and various unionist groups. It was the Central American Patriotic Union (a Central American unionist party) which made the necessary arrangements and officially called the conference at San Cristóbal de la Frontera. Likewise, the Santa Ana conference was arranged under the auspices of Dr. José Gustavo Guerrero. Once the necessary arrangements had been made, Arévalo participated fully in each conference. The first conference resulted in no appreciable advance toward a Central American federation although Arévalo did set forth his concept of "progressive federation." In the case of the conference at Santa Ana, the result was the appointment of the mixed commission which wrote the Pact of 1947.

The Pact was not a revolutionary document. Basically, it was a hodgepodge of provisions which had previously been advocated and/or tried. By the time the pact was complete in April, 1947, Arévalo seems to have become completely disillusioned as far as the possibility of a successful unification effort was concerned. By this time he had been forced to face reality and to admit that given the internal political problems of the Central American republics, his dream of a Central American federation was doomed to failure. As had happened so many times before, reality emerged victorious and the proposed federation never got off the launching pad. This was the last attempt made during his presidency to reestablish the Federation.

In the years which have passed since leaving office, Arévalo has maintained his faith in the necessity and eventual success of the unionist movement in Central America. While he has not written any major work on the subject of unification, implications of his thought

can be found in his polemical trilogy. The primary change occurring in these works has been Arévalo's stressing foreign intervention, especially by the United States, as a formidable obstacle to Central American federation. However, he sincerely feels that the republics of Central America can be reunited. He continues to have faith in his concept of "progressive federation" as the only possible means by which the Federation can be reestablished. The only change which the concept of "progressive federation" has undergone has been the result of the war between El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. No longer can the federation process begin initially with Guatemala as one member and either El Salvador or Honduras as the other. Other than this change, Arévalo holds firm to his original concept.

Thus, throughout the life and career of Juan José Arévalo, Central American unification has been a basic premise. He has written on the subject and, as president, attempted to bring about the re-establishment of the Federation. Despite the defeats suffered in such efforts, Arévalo has remained true to the unionist movement and is as firmly a unionist today as he was in the days of his youth.

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Letter: Carleton Beals, January 12, 1970.

Letter: Roberto Lavalle, March 8, 1971.

Private interview: Juan José Arévalo, La Floresta Hotel, Caracas, Venezuela, June 11, 1971.

Taped interview: Carleton Beals, Spring, 1970.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

CONVENIO SOBRE ACERCAMIENTO CENTROAMERICANO*

Suscrito en Santa Ana, El Salvador
el 12 de septiembre de 1946.

Aprobado: Decreto Legislativo, número
296, the 30 de octubre de 1946.

Canjeado: 26 de noviembre y 27 de
diciembre de 1946.

Publicado: Diario Oficial, tomo XLVIII,
número 14, de 7 de diciembre de 1946.

De acuerdo con lo estipulado en este convenio, la Comisión Guatemalteco-salvadoreña prevista en el artículo 2^o., se reunió en San Salvador el 21 de enero de 1947 y concluyó sus labores el 8 de abril del mismo año, habiendo presentado un extenso informe y numerosos proyectos y recomendaciones.

Los Presidentes de El Salvador, General Salvador Castaneda Castro, y de Guatemala, Doctor Juan José Arévalo, asistidos de sus respectivos Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, y reunidos a iniciativa del Doctor José Gustavo Guerrero, Presidente de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, con el objeto de examinar dentro de un espíritu de amplia fraternidad algunos problemas que afectan a Centro América.

Después de un examen en común, hacen las declaraciones siguientes:

*José Luis Mendoza, comp. Tratados y Convenciones Internacionales Vigentes Para Guatemala. v. IV: Pactos Bilaterales. (Guatemala: Tipografía Nacional, 1960), pp. 235-236.

1^o. - La paz es la base de su acción política.

2^o. - Ratifican su firme propósito de no intervenir en la vida interna de ningún Estado.

3^o. - Procurarán por todos los medios robustecer la vida democrática, a fin de que la libre determinación de los pueblos sea respetada.

4^o. - Mediante la práctica de un sistema de consultas procurarán confirmar el espíritu de fraternal colaboración y de solidaridad que los anima.

5^o. - Intensificarán la cultura de sus pueblos; poniendo especial empeño en combatir el analfabetismo.

6^o. - El implantamiento de una legislación social adecuada que garantice ampliamente los intereses legítimos del capital y del trabajo, dentro de un espíritu de equidad y de acuerdo con los auténticos principios democráticos, es uno de sus mayores anhelos.

Y convencidos de que las cinco secciones de Centro América están destinadas por su naturaleza, por su historia y por la evidente voluntad de sus pueblos a formar nuevamente una sola nacionalidad, en tanto se alcanza esa suprema aspiración,

Convienen:

1^o. - En proceder al estudio inmediato de las condiciones dentro de las cuales será posible realizar el acercamiento de nuestros pueblos con vista a preparar la unidad política de Centro América.

2^o. - En confiar ese estudio a una Comisión integrada por tres personas designadas por cada uno de los Gobiernos que suscriben este Convenio y de las que posteriormente se adhieran a él.

3^o. - Dicha Comisión iniciará sus trabajos en San Salvador el

el día primero de diciembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y seis.

4º.- Los Gobiernos de El Salvador y Guatemala dictarán las medidas necesarias a fin de que el presente Convenio sea ratificado por cada uno de los Congresos respectivos antes de esa fecha.

5º.- La Comisión así creada propondrá antes del primero de marzo de mil novecientos cuarenta y siete, los proyectos que deberán ser sometidos al examen y aprobación de los Gobiernos interesados.

6º.- El presente Convenio y los compromisos que eventualmente se deriven de él, no podrán en manera alguna afectar los actuales compromisos internacionales de Chapultepec y de San Francisco.

7º.- El presente Convenio queda abierto a la adhesión de los Gobiernos de Costa Rica, Honduras y Nicaragua, quienes podrán notificarle a cualquiera de las Cancillerías de los Gobiernos signatarios.

8º.- Este documento se firma por duplicado y se depositará un ejemplar del mismo en cada una de las Cancillerías de El Salvador y Guatemala.

Será registrado en la Secretaría General de las Naciones Unidas de acuerdo con la Carta de San Francisco.

Firmado en la ciudad de Santa Ana, el doce de septiembre de mil novecientos cuarenta y seis.

JUAN JOSE AREVALO

SALVADOR CASTANEDA CASTRO

EUGENIO SILVA PEÑA

H. ESCOBAR SERRANO

APPENDIX II

PROYECTO DE PACTO DE UNION CONFEDERADA DE LOS ESTADOS DE CENTRO AMERICA*

CONSIDERANDO:

Que los Presidentes de El Salvador, General Salvador Castaneda Castro y de Guatemala, Doctor Juan José Arévalo, asistidos de sus respectivos Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores, celebraron el 12 de septiembre del año de 1946, en la ciudad de Santa Ana, un convenio por el que se decidió proceder al estudio inmediato de las condiciones dentro de las que sea factible realizar el acercamiento de los pueblos centro-americanos; con vistas a preparar la unidad nacional de los Estados de Centro-América;

CONSIDERANDO:

Que en el Convenio mencionado se acordó confiar el estudio de referencia a una Comisión de tres personas, designadas por cada uno de los Gobiernos que lo suscribieron y de los que se adhiriesen a él posteriormente, la que se reuniría en esta ciudad y propondría a los Gobiernos interesados, para su examen y aprobación, las conclusiones del estudio en forma de proyectos encaminados a obtener de manera progresiva,

*Alberto Herrarte, Documentos de la Unión Centroamericana, (Guatemala: Editorial del Ministerio de Educación Pública, 1957), pp. 355-367.

fraternal y pacífica la reconstrucción de la República Federal de Centro-América;

CONSIDERANDO:

Que la Comisión integrada por quienes suscriben, de parte de Guatemala por los señores licenciados don Gustavo Santizo Gálvez, don Alberto Herrarte y don Carlos Paredes Luna, y de parte de El Salvador, por los señores doctores don Reyes Arrieta Rossi, don Ernesto Alfonso Nuñez y don Atilio Peccorini, se constituyó en esta capital el 21 de enero del año actual para estudiar las condiciones dentro de las que sea factible realizar el acercamiento de los pueblos centroamericanos, como lo previene el Pacto de Santa Ana, y realizan así mediante disposiciones de carácter económico, cultural y político, en un término no mayor de cinco años, el completo acercamiento de ellos, que permita establecer en firme la definitiva Unión Federal de Centro-América, y

Vistas y examinadas por la Comisión las respectivas credenciales de cada uno de los suscritos, las que se encontraron en buena y debida forma, han convenido dar cumplimiento a su encargo presentando a los Gobiernos interesados el siguiente:

PACTO DE UNION CONFEDERADA DE LOS ESTADOS DE
CENTRO-AMERICA

Artículo I.- Los Gobiernos de Centro-América, con el propósito de llevar a cabo la suprema aspiración de sus pueblos de realizar la unidad nacional y estimando cumplir con un alto deber patriótico, convienen con carácter preliminar una Unión Confederada de los Estados de Centro-América, de acuerdo con las disposiciones de carácter progresivo hacia ese ideal, que se fijan en el presente Pacto.

Artículo II.- Es entendido que los Estados de Centro-América no hacen abandono de su autonomía e independencia en la dirección de sus negocios. Sus Constituciones Políticas continuarán en vigor mientras no se constituya un Gobierno Nacional y se hubiere dictado la Constitución que haya de regirlo; y aun en este caso, conservarán su autonomía e independencia en lo que no se oponga a la Constitución de la República de Centro-América.

Artículo III.- Los Estados de Centro-América conservarán en sus Gobiernos el sistema republicano, democrático, representativo y alternativo de sus actuales Constituciones, y establecen que la Constitución de la Unión Federal de Centro-América deberá proclamar el mismo sistema de gobierno y que la soberanía residirá en la Nación.

Artículo IV.- Es obligación de los Estados de Centro-América observar la más estricta neutralidad en sus relaciones con cada uno de los otros y no permitir que dentro de la jurisdicción de uno de ellos se conspire contra cualquiera de los mismos; y se comprometen a no decidir en ningún caso sus disidencias por medio de las armas, sino someterlas a la decisión de la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, cuya creación se establece por el presente Pacto, la que podrá dictar, en los casos necesarios, las medidas perentorias que tiendan a mantener la paz.

Artículo V.- Los originarios de los Estados Centroamericanos residentes en cualquiera de ellos serán considerados como nacionales de los mismos, con idénticos derechos y obligaciones de los nacionales respectivos, con sólo que manifiesten ante autoridad competente su deseo en ese sentido, en caso de ser necesario ese requisito. La adquisición de esta ciudadanía no implica pérdida o limitación de la del país de origen. Gozarán, en todo caso, de los mismos derechos civiles que los nacionales

y de idéntica protección.

Artículo VI.- Se declara libre el tránsito de los nacionales de los Estados Contratantes sin necesidad de pasaportes y sin recargo alguno de derechos o impuestos administrativos, fiscales o municipales. Si en alguno de los Estados no fuere obligatoria la cédula de vecindad o identidad, los interesados para poder viajar de un Estado a otro, deberán proveerse de un documento que los indentifique, el cual podrá ser extendido por la autoridad de su residencia.

Artículo VII.- Los originarios de cada Estado que tengan adquirido un título profesional en alguno de los Estados de Centro-América, podrán ejercer libremente su profesión en el territorio del otro con arreglo a las leyes de éste, sin más requisitos que el de la autenticidad de los títulos de la identidad de las personas y la capacidad de ejercer la respectiva profesión en el Estado en el que obtuvieron el título.

Estas disposiciones se aplicarán también a los Centroamericanos de origen que hubieren obtenido el título profesional fuera del territorio de los mismos, siempre que hubieren sido incorporados en la Facultad correspondiente de cualquiera de los Estados de Centro-América.

Se declaran válidos en cada uno de los Estados los estudios científicos de otra naturaleza hechos en las Universidades, Escuelas facultativas e Institutos de Segunda Enseñanza, oficiales o autorizados, de cualquiera de los Estados de Centro-América, previos los requisitos consignados en el inciso primero de este artículo, incluso el requisito de la capacidad de ejercer los conocimientos científicos respectivos en el Estado en que se hubieren hecho los estudios, cuando sea de aplicación.

Artículo VIII.- Los instrumentos públicos extendidos en uno de

los Estados Contratantes serán válidos en los otros, siempre que además de su autenticidad constare que se han observado en su expedición las leyes del Estado de donde proceden. En materia de notariado será preciso también que se llenen los requisitos exigidos por las leyes del Estado en que han de surtir efectos.

Artículo IX.- Las autoridades judiciales de los Estados Confederados darán curso a los suplicatorios, exhortos y requisitorias en materia civil, comercial o criminal concernientes a citaciones, interrogatorios y otros actos de procedimiento o instrucción.

Los demás actos judiciales en materia civil, comercial o criminal, procedentes de acción personal, tendrán en cualquiera de los Estados igual fuerza que la de los tribunales locales de que emanan, siempre que hubieren obtenido el pareatis del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia del Estado en donde han de tener ejecución.

Artículo X.- Las naves mercantes de los Estados de la Unión Confederada se considerarán en los mares, costas y puertos de los otros Estados como naves nacionales y gozarán de las mismas exenciones, franquicias y concesiones que éstas, sin pagar otros derechos ni tener otras gravámenes que los que paguen y tengan impuestos los del respectivo Estado.

FINES DE LA UNION CONFEDERADA DE LOS ESTADOS DE CENTRO-AMERICA

Artículo XI.- Serán fines de la Unión Confederada:

- 1.^o Concurrir con todos sus esfuerzos a la reorganización definitiva de la Patria Centroamericana, de acuerdo con el presente Pacto;
- 2.^o Imprimir en la enseñanza popular un carácter esencialmente centroamericano, en sentido uniforme, haciéndola lo más amplia, práctica y

completa que sea posible de acuerdo con las tendencias pedagógicas modernas;

3.^o Desarrollar el libre comercio entre los Estados de la Unión y de cuanto tienda a hacerle más activo y provechoso, lo mismo que intensificar el comercio de Centro-América de manera conjunta en relación con los países extranjeros;

4.^o Incrementar y afianzar el crédito de los Estados de la Unión, así como su agricultura y sus industrias, en todo lo que fuere posible y con miras al provecho común de todos ellos;

5.^o Uniformar paulatinamente las legislaciones civil, comercial y penal, en las que deberá reconocerse el respeto a la propiedad y la más absoluta consagración de los derechos de la persona humana, el sistema de aduanas, el sistema monetario, el sistema de pesos y medidas y las legislaciones sobre sanidad general y especiales relativas a la sanidad de los puertos;

6.^o Establecer una marina mercante para el cabotaje y para el tráfico entre los puertos nacionales y los del exterior;

7.^o Hacer en común la defensa de los Estados Centroamericanos contra cualquiera agresión y cooperar eficazmente con la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para el aseguramiento de la paz cuando así lo requiera de los Estados dicha Organización;

8.^o Procurar porque las comunicaciones radiotelegráficas, aéreas, marítimas, y ferrocarrileras entre los Estados estén siempre expeditas de modo que el comercio y las personas en general puedan usarlas y gozar de ellas sin estorbos ni impedimentos de naturaleza alguna;

9.^o Empezar oportunamente por medio de las Cancillerías de los Estados los contactos diplomáticos con las Naciones del Continente,

teadientes a obtener el reconocimiento inmediato si posible, de la Unión Federal de Centro-América, una vez quede ésta definitivamente establecida;

10.^o El implantamiento de una legislación social adecuada que garantice ampliamente los intereses legítimos del capital y del trabajo, dentro de un espíritu de equidad y de acuerdo con los auténticos principios democráticos.

ORGANIZACION DE LA UNION CONFEDERADA DE CENTRO-AMERICA

Artículo XII.- Para el desarrollo del plan preliminar de la Unión Confederada de los Estados de Centro-América a que se refiere este Pacto, se establecerán los siguientes organismos:

- 1.^o- Una Dieta Nacional de la Unión Confederada;
- 2.^o- Una Delegación Ejecutiva de la misma Unión, y
- 3.^o- Una Corte de Justicia Centroamericana.

DIETA NACIONAL DE LA UNION CONFEDERADA

Artículo XIII.- La Dieta Nacional de la Unión Confederada se formará con cinco miembros propietarios y cinco suplentes electos por las legislaturas de cada Estado que suscriba este Pacto o después se adhiera a él; y sus atribuciones serán:

- 1.^o Darse un reglamento de orden interior;
- 2.^o Aprobar o modificar los presupuestos anuales que le someta la Delegación Ejecutiva para los gastos de la Unión Confederada;
- 3.^o Aprobar e improbar las cuentas de gastos que hubiere efectuado anualmente la Delegación Ejecutiva de la Unión;

4.^o Emitir las disposiciones que dentro de lo convenido en este Pacto sean solicitadas por la Delegación Ejecutiva de la Unión;

5.^o Formular un anteproyecto de Constitución para la Unión Federal y de las Leyes Constitutivas, a fin de someterlo a la consideración de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente;

6.^o Formular las bases para las elecciones de diputados a la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente;

7.^o Convocar a los pueblos para dichas elecciones y proveer a todo lo que sea indispensable para la solemne inauguración de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a más tardar el día 15 de septiembre de 1952;

8.^o Declarar si hay lugar o no a formar causa por delito atribuido a algún miembro de los Organismos de la Unión Confederada.

Artículo XIV.- Los miembros de la Dieta durarán en sus funciones hasta que sea instalada la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente.

Artículo XV.- La Dieta no tendrá facultades para emitir disposición alguna que aumente o disminuya las obligaciones que el presente Pacto impone a cada Estado.

Sin embargo, ya sea a iniciativa propia o a petición de la Delegación Ejecutiva, podrá modificar las estipulaciones de carácter secundario del Pacto, después de que éste tenga un año de vigencia, si así lo exigieren las necesidades o conveniencias puestas de manifiesto por la experiencia.

Para la validez de las modificaciones, será preciso que la Dieta oiga previamente a la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, y que ésta haga declaración de que considera que no contravienen a las bases de este Pacto.

En el caso de que la Corte estime que contravienen a dichas bases, deberá hacer también declaración de que por ese motivo las ha rechazado.

Cuando la opinión de la Corte fuere favorable a la admisión de las modificaciones, la Dieta, hará la declaración respectiva con los votos de las dos terceras partes de sus miembros por lo menos, incorporándolas al Pacto, en la que manifestará haber oído el parecer de la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana; y la incorporación surtirá plenos efectos desde el momento que la Dieta notifique la declaración a los Estados.

DELEGACION EJECUTIVA DE LA UNION

Artículo XVI.- La Delegación Ejecutiva de la Unión Confederada se compondrá de un miembro propietario y un suplente nombrados por cada uno de los Gobiernos de los Estados. Si a la Unión Confederada concurrieren solamente los Estados de Guatemala y El Salvador, la Delegación Ejecutiva se aumentará con un miembro propietario y un suplente por cada Estado.

Artículo XVII.- Los Delegados durarán en el ejercicio de sus funciones hasta que se instale la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente conforme a las estipulaciones de este Pacto.

Al comenzar sus funciones designarán por sorteo al Delegado que entre ellos deberá presidir durante el primer semestre, y en el siguiente semestre y así sucesivamente en los otros continuarán el sorteo excluyendo a los que ya hubieren presidido con anterioridad.

Artículo XVIII.- La Delegación Ejecutiva nombrará un Coordinador ante cada uno de los Gobiernos de los Estados, encargado de escoger de acuerdo con el Gobierno respectivo, los métodos mejores y más convenientes para la realización de los estudios y disposiciones que formule la

Delegación Ejecutiva relacionados con el correspondiente Estado. El Coordinador será también el representante de la Delegación Ejecutiva ante el respectivo Gobierno y gozará como tal de inmunidad diplomática.

Artículo XIX.- Corresponderá a la Delegación Ejecutiva hacer los estudios indispensables al implantamiento definitivo de la Unión Federal, especialmente en las materias que se indican a continuación:

- 1.º Unificación de los servicios diplomático y consular de la Unión Federal;
- 2.º Unificación aduanera;
- 3.º Establecimiento del libre comercio entre los Estados de la Unión Federal;
- 4.º Forma en que ha de procederse a la unificación de las monedas de los Estados y de sus sistemas de bancos nacionales;
- 5.º Coordinación de los sistemas tributarios en materia fiscal;
- 6.º Arreglo de las deudas externas de los Estados y forma de redimir las,
- 7.º Formación de una marina mercante nacional;
- 8.º Cualquiera otra materia de carácter económico, de igual interés general; que por la Constitución de la Unión quede comprendida en las atribuciones de la Federación;
- 9.º Unificación gradual de los Ejércitos de los Estados y la forma de integrar un Estado Mayor General de los Ejércitos así unificados de la Unión Federal de Centro-América;
- 10.º Unificación de los planes de estudios, de los textos de enseñanza que deberán imprimir en ésta un carácter eminentemente centroamericanista; y de una propaganda que intensifique el amor a la Patria Grande;
- 11.º Unificación de las legislaciones civil, comercial, penal, de

minería y del trabajo.

Para llevar a cabo los estudios que se dejan indicados y formular los correspondientes anteproyectos, podrá valerse la Delegación Ejecutiva de técnicos, en el número indispensable, sin que éste llegue, sin embargo, a ser demasiado gravoso en su remuneración para los Estados de la Unión Confederada.

CORTE DE JUSTICIA CENTROAMERICANA

Artículo XX.- La Corte de Justicia Centroamericana será un Tribunal permanente encargado de dirimir las cuestiones y controversias que surjan entre los Estados de cualquier naturaleza que sean y cualquiera que sea su origen, si los Gobiernos no hubieren podido llegar a un avenimiento.

Artículo XXI.- También conocerá la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana:

1.º De cualquier reclamo de los Estados o de los otros organismos de la Unión Confederada por violaciones del presente Pacto;

2.º De las reclamaciones de los particulares de uno de los Estados contra alguno de los otros Gobiernos contratantes, en los casos en que proceda conforme al Derecho Internacional y siempre que se hubieren agotado todos los recursos conforme a las leyes del Estado contra quien se reclama y aunque el recurrente no cuente con el apoyo de su respectivo Gobierno, y

3.º De los casos que ocurran entre algunos de los Gobiernos contratantes y personas particulares, cuando de común acuerdo le fueren sometidos.

Artículo XXII.- La Corte de Justicia Centroamericana se organizará

con cinco Magistrados propietarios y diez suplentes, electos un propietario y dos suplentes, por los Congresos de cada Estado, de entre seis candidatos propuestos por las respectivas Cortes Supremas de Justicia, que deberán ser jurisconsultos que tengan las condiciones que las leyes de cada país exijan para el ejercicio de la alta Magistratura Nacional y gocen de la más elevada consideración tanto por sus condiciones morales, como por su competencia profesional.

Si no concurrieren los cinco Estados a la celebración de este pacto, se observarán las reglas siguientes:

Si concurrieren únicamente cuatro, electos los magistrados de los cuatro en la forma que ha quedado indicada para cada país se reunirán y propondrán cada uno un candidato para propietario que deba integrar la Corte, y en caso que no se pongan de acuerdo acerca del candidato lo designarán por la suerte. Los candidatos deberán ser escogidos entre jurisconsultos pertenecientes al Estado que no ha entrado a formar parte de la Unión Confederada. En igual forma se procederá con respecto a cada uno de los suplentes.

Si solamente concurrieren tres Estados, se procederá en la misma forma señalada por la integración de la Corte en el párrafo anterior, primeramente, entre jurisconsultos de uno de los Estados no confederados, para designar a un Magistrado propietario y dos suplentes; y en seguida, entre jurisconsultos de otro Estado no confederado para designar al otro Magistrado propietario y los otros dos suplentes.

Si fueren solamente dos los Estados que formaren la Unión Confederada, cada Gobierno, previo acuerdo, y además de los magistrados designados por sus respectivos Congresos, nombrará un propietario y dos suplentes que sean de uno de los Estados no confederados. Cada uno de

los Estados que forme la Unión Confederada, deberá hacer sus designaciones entre jurisconsultos nacionales de uno solo de los Estados no confederados, distinto del escogido por el otro. Y para la elección del quinto candidato propietario y de los respectivos suplentes, que deberán ser jurisconsultos del otro Estado no confederado que no ha entrado en las designaciones, se procederá como en el caso del párrafo tercero de este artículo.

Si posteriormente alguno de los Estados no concurrentes decidiere su ingreso a la Unión Confederada, resolverá lo conveniente sobre la permanencia de los miembros que de dicho Estado hayan designado.

Artículo XXIII.- La Corte de Justicia Centroamericana al dar principio a sus funciones, designará entre sus miembros al Magistrado que habrá de presidirla. Cada año se repetirá la votación excluyendo al que o a los que hayan presidido anteriormente. También emitirá su propio reglamento y las ordenanzas de procedimiento a que deberá sujetarse en sus funciones judiciales.

Artículo XXIV.- La Corte de Justicia representa la conciencia nacional de Centro-América y en tal virtud, los magistrados que integran el Tribunal, no se considerarán ni podrán considerarse inhibidos en el ejercicio de sus funciones, por el interés que pueda tener en algún caso o alguna cuestión el Estado de quien derive su designación. En cuanto a recusaciones o implicaciones por otros motivos, las ordenanzas de procedimiento de la Corte dispondrán lo conveniente.

Artículo XXV.- En materias de hecho, la Corte juzgará conforme a su libre apreciación. En cuando a las de derecho, se fundará en los principios del Derecho Internacional y en su defecto, en doctrinas de los expositores del Derecho en general, y a falta de unos y otros, en

consideraciones de buen sentido y razón natural.

Sus sentencias deberán recaer sobre las cosas o cuestiones litigadas y en la manera en que hubieren sido disputadas.

Artículo XXVI.- A fin de hacer ejecutar las providencias que dictare en la esfera de sus atribuciones, la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana podrá dirigirse a los Tribunales de Justicia de los Estados Contratantes. También podrá nombrar comisionados especiales para la práctica de diligencias, cuando lo juzgue oportuno, y en tal caso solicitará del Gobierno donde deba practicarse la diligencia, su cooperación y auxilio. Los Gobiernos contratantes se comprometen a obedecer y hacer que se obedezcan las providencias de la Corte, prestando todos los auxilios que sean necesarios para su mejor y más pronta ejecución.

Artículo XXVII.- La Corte de Justicia Centroamericana podrá extender su jurisdicción a los Estados no Confederados, en los siguientes casos:

1.^o Cuando el Estado que no concurriere a la celebración de este Pacto desee someter a la Corte las diferencias que surjan entre él y cualquiera de los Estados firmantes del Pacto, siempre que las diferencias que surjan no tengan conexión con cuestiones anteriormente discutidas que hayan quedado pendientes en statu quo;

2.^o Cuando los Estados no confederados, de común acuerdo estimen conveniente someter a la Corte las cuestiones o controversias que surjan entre ellos, de cualquier naturaleza u origen que sean, y

3.^o En las reclamaciones a que se refieren los incisos 2.^o y 3.^o del artículo XXI del presente Pacto, previo acuerdo común entre las partes contendientes.

DISPOSICIONES GENERALES

Artículo XXVIII.- Los Estados Centroamericanos que suscriban este Pacto se obligan a sostener y cumplir sus principios y estipulaciones, y cualquiera infracción de él será objeto de juicio ante la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana según lo establece el número primero del artículo XXI.

Artículo XXIX.- Si alguno o algunos de los Estados Centroamericanos adoptare este Pacto con reservas, podrá ser admitido a la Unión Confederada, si el voto de la mayoría de los miembros de la Dieta Nacional de la Unión Confederada estuviere en favor de la admisión, la que entonces tendrá efecto con las reservas respecto a dicho Estado. En todo caso, los no adherentes serán considerados como partes disgregadas de la Nación Centroamericana y en cualquier tiempo tendrán derecho de incorporarse a la Unión Confederada que se establece en este Pacto.

Artículo XXX.- Una minoría de los miembros de los Organismos establecidos por este Pacto dictará las providencias necesarias para la concurrencia de los demás miembros, en la ciudad de Santa Ana designada provisionalmente para este efecto, mientras los Organismos en pleno deciden lo que tengan por más conveniente sobre el lugar de su residencia. Entre tanto no se emitan los Presupuestos respectivos, los viáticos y dietas de los miembros serán determinados por el Gobierno del Estado que los hubiere nombrado, quien también deberá pagarlos.

Artículo XXXI.- Los Organismos en conjunto podrán variar el lugar de su residencia cuando así lo estimen conveniente. Los miembros de ellos gozarán en el Estado de su nombramiento de las inmunidades que por su ley se reconozca a los Diputados de su Congreso, Ministros de Estado

o Magistrados de su Corte Suprema de Justicia, según los Organismos que integran; y en los otros Estados contratantes, de las inmunidades y privilegios de los Agentes Diplomáticos.

Artículo XXXII.- Es incompatible el ejercicio de los cargos de miembros de la Dieta, Delegación Ejecutiva y Magistratura de la Corte de Justicia Centroamericana, con cualquiera otra función pública, y para los de la última, con el ejercicio de la profesión. Igual incompatibilidad se establece para los miembros suplentes de dichos Organismos, mientras ejerzan las funciones de tales.

Artículo XXXIII.- Todos los gastos de presupuestos comunes de la Unión Confederada serán pagados por partes iguales por los Estados Contratantes, quienes deberán situar a cada Organismo los fondos establecidos por semestres adelantados.

Artículo XXXIV.- En caso de renuncia, fallecimiento o impedimento absoluto de algún miembro de los Organismos de la Unión Confederada, se procederá a la mayor brevedad a la designación del sustituto en la forma que se establece en este Pacto.

Artículo XXXV.- Desde el día en que comiencen sus funciones los Organismos de la Unión Confederada, deberán establecer la bandera y el escudo de la antigua Unión de Centro-América, para uso de ellos y de sus autoridades.

Artículo XXXVI.- Los Estados contratantes declaran entre ellos el libre comercio de sus productos. La Delegación Ejecutiva señalará de acuerdo con los Gobiernos de los Estados Contratantes, los productos que deban declararse excluidos del libre comercio según las condiciones específicas de cada Estado, preparando una formal unión aduanera y para mientras no se llega ella.

Artículo XXXVII.- Los Estados Contratantes dedicarán especial atención a intensificar entre ellos y con los demás de Centro-América no Confederados, el desarrollo de las comunicaciones terrestres, marítimas, ferroviarias y aéreas, mantendrán sus fronteras y puertos asequibles al tránsito de las personas y mercancías y expeditas las comunicaciones postales, telegráficas, radiotelegráficas y telefónicas. También gestionarán los Gobiernos contratantes los acuerdos necesarios para la pronta terminación de la Carretera Panamericana y patrocinarán las jiras turísticas con el objeto de desarrollar el conocimiento recíproco entre los habitantes de sus Estados.

Artículo XXXVIII.- En todo tiempo, si antes de los cinco años de la vigencia de este Pacto para llegar a la Unión definitiva, los Gobiernos de los Estados estimaren de común acuerdo que puede acelerarse el advenimiento de dicha Unión, a solicitud de los mismos la Dieta Nacional convocará a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente para que dicte la Carta Fundamental de la Nación.

Artículo XXXIX.- El presente Pacto se registrará por los Estados Contratantes en la Secretaría General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, siendo entendido que los compromisos que de él se derivan no afectan otros compromisos internacionales vigentes, contraídos con anterioridad por los Estados de la Unión Confederada.

Artículo XL.- El presente Pacto será sometido a los Gobiernos contratantes para su aprobación, y al tener lugar ésta deberán ellos someterlo a la ratificación constitucional de las Asambleas Legislativas de sus Estados. Si las Asambleas lo ratifican deberán proceder al canje de las ratificaciones sus respectivas Cancillerías, en la forma y lugar que de común acuerdo determinen.

Los Gobiernos no concurrentes en la celebración del Pacto remitirán al adherirse los instrumentos de su adhesión a las Cancillerías de los Estados contratantes, y la fecha del último acuse de recibo de dichos instrumentos, expedidos por alguna de las Cancillerías mencionadas, constituirá la de la vigencia del Pacto para el Estado que se adhirió.

Las Cancillerías de los Estados Contratantes al recibir los instrumentos de adhesión de alguno de los Estados no concurrentes en la celebración del Pacto, pondrán el hecho en conocimiento de los otros que tampoco fueron concurrentes, ya sea que se hubieren adherido o no posteriormente, para los efectos que se deriven o puedan derivarse de la adhesión.

San Salvador, 8 de abril de 1947.

Reyes Arrieta Rossi, Delegado por El Salvador; Ernesto Alfonso Núñez, Delegado por El Salvador; Atilio Peccorini, Delegado por El Salvador; Gustavo Santiso Gálvez, Delegado por Guatemala; Alberto Herrarte, Delegado por Guatemala; Carlos Paredes Luna, Delegado por Guatemala.

VITA

Jefferson M. Bishop was born in Bullard, Texas, on March 4, 1941. He began his public school education in Bullard and completed the last eight years in Texas City. He graduated with honors from Texas City High School in May, 1959. He attended Sam Houston State Teachers College (now Sam Houston State University) from 1959 to 1963, from which he received his B.A. degree and Texas Teaching Certificate in May, 1963. He taught in the Department of Government at Sam Houston prior to commencing his study as an NDEA Fellow at Louisiana State University in September, 1963. He received his M.A. degree from Louisiana State University in January, 1966. Since September, 1966, he has been a member of the Department of Government faculty at Texas A&I University, Kingsville. He is presently a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Latin American Studies Institute, Louisiana State University.

EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Jefferson Mack Bishop

Major Field: Latin American Studies

Title of Thesis: Arevalo and Central American Unification

Approved:

Jane L. Grammond
Major Professor and Chairman

Max Woodrich
Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE.

J. P. Moore
Herman E. Daly
A. Cardinal Jr
R. H. Manning

Date of Examination:

June 9, 1971